Il s'agit d'un extrait de papier, rédigé par l'ambassadeur américain à Alger, R. Ford, à l'intention de S. WELCH qui devait venir en visite la semaine suivante (Février 2008) :
REGIONAL POLICIES: FAR APART FROM US
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7. (C) Bouteflika is very much his own foreign minister and his thinking about regional politics has evolved little from the 1970s. He loyally attends all the NAM and African Union summits, and he places huge weight on the United Nations, liberation ideology and negotiation over use of force (especially Western armed forces). The Algerians are surprisingly ill informed when events are moving in the region ; they also lack a good grounding in underlying trends in areas like the Middle-East. Arab satellite TV seems to be a big source of their information. Hence, you will find that the Algerians take nettlesome positions on the regional questions of import to us :
-- Peace Process : They line up behind the Arab League consensus, arguing in private that it is hopeless to try to exclude Syria and Hamas from the efforts to reach a settlement. They appreciate our pledge to work for a viable Palestinian state and to achieve short-term, concrete improvements for the Palestinians. So far, we have seen little enthusiasm in response to our demarches for more aid to the Palestinian Authority, but they likely would respond to a strong request from the Arab League. The Algerian public, particularly the Islamists, is now less preoccupied with violence in Algeria and vehemently anti-Israeli. The GoA, therefore, is unlikely to make any unilateral gestures to Israel.
-- Lebanon : The Algerians back Arab League efforts and hope for consensus to develop among the Lebanese factions. Their senior MFA official working Middle-East issues has repeatedly cautioned us against trying to isolate Syria on Lebanese issues. Underlining how our efforts complement Arab League efforts will make the most headway with the Algerians.
-- Iraq : President Bouteflika told Senator Nelson last summer that the U.S. should not withdraw too quickly from Iraq lest security deteriorate further. The MFA and Algerian military intelligence have made the same point to us more recently, although publicly the GoA says little. There is an Iraqi embassy in Algiers, but relations with the Iraqi Government are cool. The Algerians have no intention of reopening an embassy in Baghdad. In part, they are still angry about the murder of two of their diplomats in Baghdad in 2005. Despite their repeated inquiries, they have received no information on who was responsible. In addition, public and government distrust of the Iraqi Shia makes the GoA unwilling to take any risks on Iraq policy. Their military intelligence likely would work discretely with Iraqi intelligence to disrupt al-Qaida activities, but we doubt Algerian officers would actually go to Iraq.
-- Iran : Algerian officials remember Iranian support for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and are suspicious of Iranans regional intent. President Bouteflika in private has told the Iranian President to cooperate with the UN on the nuclear issue. The GoA is also adamant that we should continue on the diplomatic track and recognize even small Iranian steps when we see them; they were reluctant to endorse more pressure on Iran during Ambassador Schulte's visit here in late November. The Algerian leadership has a bit of sympathy for Hizballah and Hamas as liberation fighters, but their heads tell them to be wary. Thus, you will hear understanding from them when we warn them of the dangers of these terror groups, but the Algerians will immediately insist that Israel and the U.S. have to resolve the Palestinian and Lebanese problems. Underlining how Hizballah and Hamas threaten the very progress on the Lebanese and Palestinian issues that the GoA wants will be the most effective arguments.
-- Western Sahara : This is the issue that the GoA cares the most about and you will likely receive an earful. The GoA still lingers over the hope that the Baker Plan will come back despite our telling them repeatedly that it is finished. The top Algerian leadership stress that they view a Saharan referendum on independence as a matter of national liberation as a matter of principle. They don't want to destabilize Morocco, and they doubt the Western-Sahara is so important to the throne's hold on power. They do not want to start armed hostilities, although we are less sure they would - or could - stop every possible Polisario provocation. The Algerians likely will try to wait for the end of this American administration hoping that the next one will be less supportive of the Moroccan autonomy proposal. Explaining the exhaustion of broad American patience with the long-standing dispute will be the best way of shaking loose the Algerian fixation on Baker.
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7. (C) Bouteflika is very much his own foreign minister and his thinking about regional politics has evolved little from the 1970s. He loyally attends all the NAM and African Union summits, and he places huge weight on the United Nations, liberation ideology and negotiation over use of force (especially Western armed forces). The Algerians are surprisingly ill informed when events are moving in the region ; they also lack a good grounding in underlying trends in areas like the Middle-East. Arab satellite TV seems to be a big source of their information. Hence, you will find that the Algerians take nettlesome positions on the regional questions of import to us :
-- Peace Process : They line up behind the Arab League consensus, arguing in private that it is hopeless to try to exclude Syria and Hamas from the efforts to reach a settlement. They appreciate our pledge to work for a viable Palestinian state and to achieve short-term, concrete improvements for the Palestinians. So far, we have seen little enthusiasm in response to our demarches for more aid to the Palestinian Authority, but they likely would respond to a strong request from the Arab League. The Algerian public, particularly the Islamists, is now less preoccupied with violence in Algeria and vehemently anti-Israeli. The GoA, therefore, is unlikely to make any unilateral gestures to Israel.
-- Lebanon : The Algerians back Arab League efforts and hope for consensus to develop among the Lebanese factions. Their senior MFA official working Middle-East issues has repeatedly cautioned us against trying to isolate Syria on Lebanese issues. Underlining how our efforts complement Arab League efforts will make the most headway with the Algerians.
-- Iraq : President Bouteflika told Senator Nelson last summer that the U.S. should not withdraw too quickly from Iraq lest security deteriorate further. The MFA and Algerian military intelligence have made the same point to us more recently, although publicly the GoA says little. There is an Iraqi embassy in Algiers, but relations with the Iraqi Government are cool. The Algerians have no intention of reopening an embassy in Baghdad. In part, they are still angry about the murder of two of their diplomats in Baghdad in 2005. Despite their repeated inquiries, they have received no information on who was responsible. In addition, public and government distrust of the Iraqi Shia makes the GoA unwilling to take any risks on Iraq policy. Their military intelligence likely would work discretely with Iraqi intelligence to disrupt al-Qaida activities, but we doubt Algerian officers would actually go to Iraq.
-- Iran : Algerian officials remember Iranian support for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and are suspicious of Iranans regional intent. President Bouteflika in private has told the Iranian President to cooperate with the UN on the nuclear issue. The GoA is also adamant that we should continue on the diplomatic track and recognize even small Iranian steps when we see them; they were reluctant to endorse more pressure on Iran during Ambassador Schulte's visit here in late November. The Algerian leadership has a bit of sympathy for Hizballah and Hamas as liberation fighters, but their heads tell them to be wary. Thus, you will hear understanding from them when we warn them of the dangers of these terror groups, but the Algerians will immediately insist that Israel and the U.S. have to resolve the Palestinian and Lebanese problems. Underlining how Hizballah and Hamas threaten the very progress on the Lebanese and Palestinian issues that the GoA wants will be the most effective arguments.
-- Western Sahara : This is the issue that the GoA cares the most about and you will likely receive an earful. The GoA still lingers over the hope that the Baker Plan will come back despite our telling them repeatedly that it is finished. The top Algerian leadership stress that they view a Saharan referendum on independence as a matter of national liberation as a matter of principle. They don't want to destabilize Morocco, and they doubt the Western-Sahara is so important to the throne's hold on power. They do not want to start armed hostilities, although we are less sure they would - or could - stop every possible Polisario provocation. The Algerians likely will try to wait for the end of this American administration hoping that the next one will be less supportive of the Moroccan autonomy proposal. Explaining the exhaustion of broad American patience with the long-standing dispute will be the best way of shaking loose the Algerian fixation on Baker.
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