Annonce

**Numidio** · 17 décembre 2010, 20h38

XXXXXXXXXXXX*

XXXXXXXXXXXX, told Ambassador December 17*
that there is a growing gap between what ordinary Algerians*
see as their key needs and what they perceive the government*
is offering in terms of wages and quality of life. As a*
result, he said, fewer Algerians are willing to help the*
government. The word on the street, he said, is that if you*
have to do business in a government office, go but then leave*
promptly and stay out of the way.*

4. (C) On the other hand, Djaballah told us that widespread*
disenchantment about the government's willingness to share*
power with Islamists ultimately prompted Algerian Islamists*
to heed calls by his and other Islamist parties to boycott*
the November 29 local elections. They understand, he said,*
that the new electoral law (ref C) was designed to*
marginalize them and perpetuate the ruling coalition's grip*
on power. Closing out political space will merely spur more*
extremism, he warned. The Ambassador told Djaballah that the*
U.S. favors political liberalization in Algeria but we also*
understand that this may have to be done gradually. The U.S.*
does not want to see a return to the violence of the 1990s*
and is working with the GOA against those who actively seek*
it. He welcomed Djaballah's effort to play in the legal*
political system. The important point, the Ambassador*
underlined, is that while political evolution might be slow*
it needs to be in a steady direction of liberalization.*
Djaballah accepted the point and appreciated our having*
raised election process problems with the GOA.*

A RULING "GANG FROM TIKRIT"*
---------------------------*

5. (C) Commenting on the stability of the country, XXXXXXXXXXXX*
stressed that Algerians "have been through far worse than*
this," and that internal divisions should not be mistaken for*
instability. The regime, XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out, values*
stability above all else, and is consequently both fragile*
and stable at the same time. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed with an analogy*
made by Sadi both to us and publicly in the press, comparing*
the Bouteflika government to "a gang from Tikrit" in which a*
disproportionate number of cabinet ministers and generals*
came from the same region in the western province of Tlemcen*
as President Bouteflika. (Indeed, many in the inner circle*
come from the small town of Nedrumah.) The loyalty of this*
"gang," according to XXXXXXXXXXXX and Sadi, is key to maintaining*
stability, just as it did in Saddamn Hussein's Iraq.*

SADI: "STAND UP FOR OUR YOUTH"*
------------------------------*

6. (C) Sadi warned of the long-term dangers of the U.S.*
remaining silent on what he perceived as the deterioration of*
Algerian democracy, as evidenced by the local elections. In*
Sadi's view, outside support is critical to the survival of*
democracy and the productive engagement of Algerian youth --*
70 percent of the population -- in political and economic*
life. If the U.S. is seen to be complicit in meaningless*
elections and the process of amending the constitution to*
allow Bouteflika to run for a third term, he warned, it risks*
losing the youth demographic for the future.*

7. (C) The Ambassador reminded Sadi of our fruitless efforts*
to maintain a National Democratic Institute program in*
Algeria that the Interior Ministry consciously shut down; few*
political parties had pushed hard to save it. Ambassador*
told Sadi we had raised on multiple occasions problems with*
the election process and its credibility. He noted to Sadi*
that we had heard other parties ask for more public U.S.*
support, and urged the RCD and other Algerian parties to make*
their voices heard. The U.S. would be credible in raising*
obstacles to liberalization only if the Algerian political*
parties themselves spoke out loudly. Given the absence of an*
international election monitoring commissions in the 2008*
legislative and local elections, the Ambassador advised Sadi*
to consider sooner rather than later generating public*
requests for international observers for the 2009*
presidential elections.*

STABILITY IN THE HANDS OF A DIVIDED MILITARY...*
--------------------------------------------- --*

8. (S) Sadi, who maintains contacts with elements of the*

ALGIERS*00001806 003*OF 004*

Algerian military and security services, told us that the*
army was no longer as unified as it had been even a few years*
ago. Two splits were emerging, he said. The first is among*
younger officers who know Algeria is not well and blame the*
old guard for neglect and mismanagement. These officers,*
Sadi said, want change and feel an increasing sense of*
urgency that the country is adrift. The second split*
identified by Sadi lies within the senior ranks of the*
military, between officers who favor a tougher approach to*
security and counter-terrorism (the "eradicateurs") and those*
still aligned with Bouteflika's national reconciliation*
policy. XXXXXXXXXXXX, whose brother*
is an army officer, said on December 17 that there are*
colonels in the Algerian military who think the current drift*
cannot continue. The question, XXXXXXXXXXXX whispered, is whether*
they can organize themselves.*

9. (S) Sadi told us of at least one conversation he has had*
recently with General Toufik Mediene, the head of Algeria's*
DRS (military intelligence apparatus) who is widely viewed as*
the key figure in ensuring regime control and survival. He*
said Mediene acknowledged that all was not well with the*
health of Bouteflika and Algeria writ large. However,*
according to Sadi, Mediene said that he needed some kind of*
reassurance that any political alternative "would be viable"*
and, by implication, would not destabilize the country. Sadi*
said that many senior officers were beginning to wonder if*
they could get the army out of politics altogether, without*
fear of public retribution for past abuses during the civil*
war.*

...WHILE CORRUPTION AND OIL PRICES REACH NEW HEIGHTS*
--------------------------------------------- -------*

10. (S) Sadi, Djaballah, XXXXXXXXXXXX and numerous other*
contacts have told us that corruption has reached*
unprecedented levels in the current regime. As we reported*
in ref D, the ruling FLN party, intent on laying the*
groundwork for a Bouteflika third term, has sought to install*
local officials through electoral wrangling based on loyalty*
even at the expense of competence. With oil prices at record*
highs, former Finance and Prime Minister Benbitour told*
Ambassador in November, there was less incentive for the*
regime to carry out much-needed reforms. High oil prices are*
bringing incredible wealth into the country, Benbitour told*
us, but ordinary people are not seeing any impact on their*
daily lives. (Indeed, Benbitour publicly coined a term we*
see often in the media now: Algeria is rich, but the people*
are poor. Islamist leader Djaballah used it with us often on*
December 17.) Corruption, XXXXXXXXXXXX, has reached epic*
proportions, even within the military. He cited Lieutenant*
General Ahmad Gaid Salah, commander of Algerian military*
forces, as perhaps the most corrupt official in the military*
apparatus, something other contacts have told us as well.*
When Sadi mentioned the corruption problem to General*
Mediene, Sadi said, Mediene acknowledged the problem.*
Motioning silently to the portrait of Bouteflika that hung*
over their heads, he indicated to Sadi that the extent of the*
problem went all the way to the top. (Comment: many embassy*
contacts think President Bouteflika himself is not*
particularly corrupt, but they readily finger the President's*
brothers, Said and Abdallah, as being particularly rapacious.*
The Algerian military, meanwhile, has launched an*
anti-corruption program that is ambitious by Algerian*
standards but has left the senior leadership relatively*
untouched. End Comment.)*

COMMENT: AN AILING REGIME, AN AILING PRESIDENT*
--------------------------------------------- -*

11. (S) Our Algerian contacts are often a grumpy lot, but we*
now hear more than the ordinary amount of concern about the*
GOA's inability or unwillingness to address political,*
economic and security problems. The bombings and the debate*
about how to handle Islamist extremism also are starting to*
remind of the ferocious arguments within Algerian society*
during the worst of 1990s violence. These contacts agree*
that while the 1990s showed most Algerians can withstand lots*
of pain, the December 11 bombings laid bare the regime's lack*
of vision and inability to manage the pressures. We are*
starting to hear echoes of a debate within some circles of*
the military establishment of an increasingly polarized*

ALGIERS*00001806 004*OF 004*

debate over national reconciliation has become a discussion*
about the viability of Bouteflika's government itself.*
According to our contacts, stability remains the top priority*
even among officials on opposite sides of the debate,*
although they see stability as flowing not from Bouteflika's*
leadership but from a military apparatus that appears to*
realize that the buck stops with them. The new element is*
the push from Prime Minister Belkhadem and the FLN apparatus,*
probably with impetus from Bouteflika's brothers if not*
President Bouteflika himself, to arrange a constitutional*
amendment and a third term. Sadi, a medical doctor, said*
that both Bouteflika and Algeria itself were in critical*
condition and fading. According to Sadi (who may or may not*
know), Bouteflika suffers from terminal stomach cancer, and*
the regime lies on the operating table, slipping towards a*
point of no return as "untrained surgeons" stand by.*
Meanwhile, the government's seeming inability to jump-start*
the stagnant economy has Algerians, especially youth, feeling*
gloomy and grim about the fate of their country as it drifts*
into the new year.*
FORD*

Annonce

Wikileaks: AN AILING AND FRAGILE ALGERIAN REGIME DRIFTS INTO 2008

Wikileaks: AN AILING AND FRAGILE ALGERIAN REGIME DRIFTS INTO 2008

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