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With protests against Tunisian President Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali having succeeded and those against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak posing an existential threat to his government, there is a growing view that it is only a matter of time before the revolutionary spirit spreads throughout the Middle East and North Africa.*
Algeria is frequently mentioned as the next domino likely to fall. But Algeria is not Egypt or Tunisia, let alone Jordan or Yemen, whose leaders have also come under popular pressure lately. There are a number of reasons why mass popular protest will not emerge in Algeria and why President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s regime is in no greater jeopardy than it normally is.*
The plainest argument for the unlikelihood of unrest in Algeria is that the regime has had the benefit of observing and learning from the missteps of Ben Ali and Mubarak. Bouteflika is also very likely watching to see what effect King Abdullah’s recent replacement of the Jordanian government has had. That Bouteflika has had more time to prepare for popular protests argues against the effectiveness of such protests. And in a move aimed at mollifying the regime’s critics, on February 3 Bouteflika announced the imminent end to the emergency laws that have restricted public gatherings in Algeria since 1992.*
A more nuanced explanation of why Algeria is different than other states in the Middle East is that Algeria effectively had its revolution, and has no stomach for another. In 1991, Algeria’s first multiparty elections were leading toward a triumph for the Islamic Salvation Front. The military stepped in and the country plunged into the Dark Decade – 10 years of violence and horrific bloodletting. The experience left many Algerians wary of abrupt change. They still seek change, but not if this means risking descending into another decade of chaos.*
On the political level, one of the factors that led to Ben Ali’s sudden departure from Tunisia was that he had lost the support of the military and was abandoned even by members of his inner circle. By contrast, the leadership in Algeria is already split and there is a power struggle taking place among decision-makers, albeit discretely and in slow motion. The power struggle has played out over the last year with corruption investigations leading to the removal of government officials, assassinations and the manipulation of political parties.
There are significant economic differences as well. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and especially Yemen, Algeria has ample finances on hand to buy its way out of any popular unrest that arises from the increase in cost of living. Algeria’s $157 billion foreign exchange reserves give it wide fiscal maneuverability. It is estimated that the country has another $60 billion in an oil stabilization fund.*
For example, during the protests in early January over rising food prices, Algeria suspended the 17 percent VAT and import duties on foodstuffs in order to bring prices back down. In short, Algeria had the fiscal leeway to sacrifice tax revenue for the sake of stability. With oil now trading above $100 per barrel, partially due to uncertainty over Egypt’s direction, Algeria has even more room to maneuver.
Another big difference between Algeria and Tunisia or Egypt is simply how cities are laid out. Unlike Tunis or Cairo, Algiers has no big squares or open urban spaces where protestors can gather and which they can occupy. During the 19th century, the French colonial powers struggled to draft a coherent urban plan for Algiers. The city developed in a disorderly way. Later, as Algerians waged a war of independence against the French, the security advantages of not having large open urban spaces became clearer. Still later, the Algerian government itself recognized the advantages of having limited public space and discouraged the laying out of big squares.*
Urban geography also plays a role. Algiers is not an easily “walkable” city. It is hilly, scattered and difficult to get around. There are few wide boulevards. There are no bridges on which to clash with police. In fact, the city is more conducive to street fighting than it is to mass demonstrations, something the French authorities learned when they were in control and the Algerian government after independence.*
That is not to say that Algeria is a happy place, immune from popular discontent. Algerians have much to be angry about and they have reason to claim that their government has failed them. Algeria had the world’s 12th largest global foreign exchange reserves in 2010, ahead of France and the United Kingdom. But according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Cities Livability Index, in 2010 Algiers ranked third worst in the world, on par with Dhaka. Housing is in short supply, employment is scarce, and the bureaucracy is domineering.*
Even so, a popular revolution is unlikely to unfold in Algeria. There may be popular protests and demonstrations against Bouteflika, but there are too many factors weighing against such action bringing down the government. In short, Algeria appears to play against the “falling dominoes” argument.
Geoff D. Porter*is director of GDP Consulting in New York, which focuses on North Africa. He wrote this commentary for*THE DAILY STAR.
Algeria is frequently mentioned as the next domino likely to fall. But Algeria is not Egypt or Tunisia, let alone Jordan or Yemen, whose leaders have also come under popular pressure lately. There are a number of reasons why mass popular protest will not emerge in Algeria and why President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s regime is in no greater jeopardy than it normally is.*
The plainest argument for the unlikelihood of unrest in Algeria is that the regime has had the benefit of observing and learning from the missteps of Ben Ali and Mubarak. Bouteflika is also very likely watching to see what effect King Abdullah’s recent replacement of the Jordanian government has had. That Bouteflika has had more time to prepare for popular protests argues against the effectiveness of such protests. And in a move aimed at mollifying the regime’s critics, on February 3 Bouteflika announced the imminent end to the emergency laws that have restricted public gatherings in Algeria since 1992.*
A more nuanced explanation of why Algeria is different than other states in the Middle East is that Algeria effectively had its revolution, and has no stomach for another. In 1991, Algeria’s first multiparty elections were leading toward a triumph for the Islamic Salvation Front. The military stepped in and the country plunged into the Dark Decade – 10 years of violence and horrific bloodletting. The experience left many Algerians wary of abrupt change. They still seek change, but not if this means risking descending into another decade of chaos.*
On the political level, one of the factors that led to Ben Ali’s sudden departure from Tunisia was that he had lost the support of the military and was abandoned even by members of his inner circle. By contrast, the leadership in Algeria is already split and there is a power struggle taking place among decision-makers, albeit discretely and in slow motion. The power struggle has played out over the last year with corruption investigations leading to the removal of government officials, assassinations and the manipulation of political parties.
There are significant economic differences as well. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and especially Yemen, Algeria has ample finances on hand to buy its way out of any popular unrest that arises from the increase in cost of living. Algeria’s $157 billion foreign exchange reserves give it wide fiscal maneuverability. It is estimated that the country has another $60 billion in an oil stabilization fund.*
For example, during the protests in early January over rising food prices, Algeria suspended the 17 percent VAT and import duties on foodstuffs in order to bring prices back down. In short, Algeria had the fiscal leeway to sacrifice tax revenue for the sake of stability. With oil now trading above $100 per barrel, partially due to uncertainty over Egypt’s direction, Algeria has even more room to maneuver.
Another big difference between Algeria and Tunisia or Egypt is simply how cities are laid out. Unlike Tunis or Cairo, Algiers has no big squares or open urban spaces where protestors can gather and which they can occupy. During the 19th century, the French colonial powers struggled to draft a coherent urban plan for Algiers. The city developed in a disorderly way. Later, as Algerians waged a war of independence against the French, the security advantages of not having large open urban spaces became clearer. Still later, the Algerian government itself recognized the advantages of having limited public space and discouraged the laying out of big squares.*
Urban geography also plays a role. Algiers is not an easily “walkable” city. It is hilly, scattered and difficult to get around. There are few wide boulevards. There are no bridges on which to clash with police. In fact, the city is more conducive to street fighting than it is to mass demonstrations, something the French authorities learned when they were in control and the Algerian government after independence.*
That is not to say that Algeria is a happy place, immune from popular discontent. Algerians have much to be angry about and they have reason to claim that their government has failed them. Algeria had the world’s 12th largest global foreign exchange reserves in 2010, ahead of France and the United Kingdom. But according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Cities Livability Index, in 2010 Algiers ranked third worst in the world, on par with Dhaka. Housing is in short supply, employment is scarce, and the bureaucracy is domineering.*
Even so, a popular revolution is unlikely to unfold in Algeria. There may be popular protests and demonstrations against Bouteflika, but there are too many factors weighing against such action bringing down the government. In short, Algeria appears to play against the “falling dominoes” argument.
Geoff D. Porter*is director of GDP Consulting in New York, which focuses on North Africa. He wrote this commentary for*THE DAILY STAR.
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