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March 4, 2011, 12:15 pm
By C.J. CHIVERS
Friday’s New York Times covered fears that looted Libyan arms could find their way into terrorists’ hands. The article’s emphasis is on heat-seeking, shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft missiles and the threats they pose to civilian aircraft.
But it is worth noting on this blog, which discusses military small arms from many different perspectives, that the looting of the stockpiles of traditional infantry arms raises serious long-term security concerns, too. Once machine guns, assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades slip from state arsenals, they invariably travel. Their migration to other users and other wars is all but certain. Their grim effects can last decades.
Remember, well-made military small-arms tend to outlast their users and their previous owners’ intentions. Machine guns in state hands that are suddenly put to public uses a reasonable person might readily support — say, chasing away a corrupt dictator and his hired thugs, with their own weapons — find new owners and new uses soon after. Why? Because durable weapons are commodities. People sell them. Then market forces and social forces combine and take over, typically putting large portions of these weapons into the hands of those whom reasonable people would rather not see well-armed. For one example, read this excellent account of the disruptive effects of the looting of Idi Amin’s stockpiles in 1979. Or, ask anyone unfortunate enough to have suffered much of the past decade in Iraq. Or the past several decades in Afghanistan. Or Somalia. Or Chechnya. And there are other examples, too. You can expect that arms from Libya’s now loose stockpiles will turn up in many places in the months and years ahead.
Let me now drop this ride into reverse and back up on MANPADS, as weapons in the Stinger family are often called. Please look at the photograph above. Tyler Hicks made this image on Thursday, very quickly, of the stenciled markings on an SA-7 carried along the road by a Libyan rebel. MANPADS are not often loose in the public’s hands. And unlike with the more commonly seen military small arms, there are very few open-source resources for identifying distinguishing markings on the weapons. This makes it difficult, at a glance, to know how to read a weapon’s factory markings, and to trace its provenance. There is a similar dearth of publicly-circulating information on the packaging on crates that contain MANPADS.
So, a naked appeal: For those of you who visit this blog and who work in the arms business, or in nonproliferation, or in other communities that cover this beat, I invite you to send me or point me to any available keys to help with the fine-grained identification of these and other MANPADS. I have a rich set of field references for small-arms cartridges, and many military small arms, as well as a stable of sources who help me when we get stumped. But the resources for identifying MANPADS are less widely distributed. I would welcome any help.
About the Photographs
Have another peek at the top image, of a rebel on a road carrying an SA-7. This gentleman, like many now in eastern Libya, is in possession of an incomplete weapon system; the item slung on his back is the launch tube. Without other components, even if he knew how to arm and effectively fire an SA-7 (which is doubtful) he would be unable to do so. Put another way, as equipped, this rebel and his weapon are roughly as dangerous to a passing Boeing or Airbus as a man standing on the road with a baseball bat.
But that’s not much reassurance. The scene is actually a common one in the early stages of leakage of weapons from freshly unsecured state arsenals. Many people rush into arsenals and take up formerly government-owned arms that that they think they might need. Again, this might be perfectly reasonable behavior. Later, they realize that they don’t need them any more, or want them any more, or would rather have the cash they can provide than have an anti-aircraft missile (or assault rifle, or box of grenades) stashed under their bed. Then they sell them. From this point forward, more sophisticated processes take hold. The weapons move onto and through markets, and then to other fights — often arriving in the hands of people who do know how to use them, and are willing to put them to dark use. At this point — weeks, months or years on — the risks multiply.
While it has already been well established that Libya’s stocks of portable antiaircraft missiles have been broken into by rebels in the country’s east, what is less known is how well the now loose missiles might work. The one bit of evidence so far, a photograph by Tyler Hicks, suggests that at least some of the looted stock was manufactured in 1977. Manpads, as these weapons are commonly called, are perishable items, and can become less reliable with the passage of time, the exposure to elements, and, like many munitions, to heat cycling, or the exposure to swings in ambient temperature over time.
One further glimpse from Libya shows that the weapons may be serviceable. Look at the photograph above, filed by Reuters. It shows one of the SA-7s being fired by a Libyan man. In at least this case, the SA-7 was operable enough that the battery cooling unit was able to power the unit’s seeker head, and to start the boost motor that propels the missile free of the launch tube in the opening instant of flight.
Matthew Schroeder, the researcher for the Federation of American Scientists who tracks Manpads proliferation, said that while this image is suggestive that some missiles in Libyan SA-7 stocks may function no matter their advanced age, the image itself falls short of conclusive evidence. In order for the weapon to work, the propellant that would ignite after the missile flew clear of this photograph’s frame would still have to push the missile along at a consistent supersonic speed, and across its full normal range in order to catch up to and strike many classes of targeted aircraft. Whether the Libyan stocks were maintained well enough to perform as designed is not yet clear. That said, the image serves to confirm that worries that the loose weapons might in fact work are justified.
Mr. Schroeder cautioned that the data sample — one photograph — remained small. “One could fire, the next five might not,” he said by telephone from Washington.
About those weapons, the crowd-sourcing request in this morning’s post paid a swift dividend. One reader, publicly identified on the blog only as “Sheep,” quickly provided a helpful document that suggests that the SA-7 Tyler Hicks photographed yesterday was the product of the Soviet Union, and that this particular weapon is the abundant SA-7b variant. In particular, the 9M32M stenciled in the launch tube’s side is the Soviet Union’s product designator for its improved (or “modernized”) SA-7. What is not yet clear is whether other Eastern Bloc manufacturers of the SA-7, for example, Bulgaria, used this product designator as well. If yes, that string of characters might not narrow the search conclusively. All that said, for those interested, I recommend reading the link that Sheep posted on this blog. It’s very informative.
The possible Russian or Soviet origins of the missile stocks visible so far would be unsurprising, given the Kremlin’s long military-to-military engagement with Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi and his military and security services. What also remains unknown is when these missiles entered Libyan possession, and how they might have been stored over the years. We have other images of the weapons’ packaging, which in many cases looks weathered.
Other sources have also been in touch and are helping with the effort to free up full reference keys of markings of Manpads in circulation today. These could prove very helpful, and At War extends a hearty thank-you. Keep the tips coming.
The New York Times
By C.J. CHIVERS
Friday’s New York Times covered fears that looted Libyan arms could find their way into terrorists’ hands. The article’s emphasis is on heat-seeking, shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft missiles and the threats they pose to civilian aircraft.
But it is worth noting on this blog, which discusses military small arms from many different perspectives, that the looting of the stockpiles of traditional infantry arms raises serious long-term security concerns, too. Once machine guns, assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades slip from state arsenals, they invariably travel. Their migration to other users and other wars is all but certain. Their grim effects can last decades.
Remember, well-made military small-arms tend to outlast their users and their previous owners’ intentions. Machine guns in state hands that are suddenly put to public uses a reasonable person might readily support — say, chasing away a corrupt dictator and his hired thugs, with their own weapons — find new owners and new uses soon after. Why? Because durable weapons are commodities. People sell them. Then market forces and social forces combine and take over, typically putting large portions of these weapons into the hands of those whom reasonable people would rather not see well-armed. For one example, read this excellent account of the disruptive effects of the looting of Idi Amin’s stockpiles in 1979. Or, ask anyone unfortunate enough to have suffered much of the past decade in Iraq. Or the past several decades in Afghanistan. Or Somalia. Or Chechnya. And there are other examples, too. You can expect that arms from Libya’s now loose stockpiles will turn up in many places in the months and years ahead.
Let me now drop this ride into reverse and back up on MANPADS, as weapons in the Stinger family are often called. Please look at the photograph above. Tyler Hicks made this image on Thursday, very quickly, of the stenciled markings on an SA-7 carried along the road by a Libyan rebel. MANPADS are not often loose in the public’s hands. And unlike with the more commonly seen military small arms, there are very few open-source resources for identifying distinguishing markings on the weapons. This makes it difficult, at a glance, to know how to read a weapon’s factory markings, and to trace its provenance. There is a similar dearth of publicly-circulating information on the packaging on crates that contain MANPADS.
So, a naked appeal: For those of you who visit this blog and who work in the arms business, or in nonproliferation, or in other communities that cover this beat, I invite you to send me or point me to any available keys to help with the fine-grained identification of these and other MANPADS. I have a rich set of field references for small-arms cartridges, and many military small arms, as well as a stable of sources who help me when we get stumped. But the resources for identifying MANPADS are less widely distributed. I would welcome any help.
About the Photographs
Have another peek at the top image, of a rebel on a road carrying an SA-7. This gentleman, like many now in eastern Libya, is in possession of an incomplete weapon system; the item slung on his back is the launch tube. Without other components, even if he knew how to arm and effectively fire an SA-7 (which is doubtful) he would be unable to do so. Put another way, as equipped, this rebel and his weapon are roughly as dangerous to a passing Boeing or Airbus as a man standing on the road with a baseball bat.
But that’s not much reassurance. The scene is actually a common one in the early stages of leakage of weapons from freshly unsecured state arsenals. Many people rush into arsenals and take up formerly government-owned arms that that they think they might need. Again, this might be perfectly reasonable behavior. Later, they realize that they don’t need them any more, or want them any more, or would rather have the cash they can provide than have an anti-aircraft missile (or assault rifle, or box of grenades) stashed under their bed. Then they sell them. From this point forward, more sophisticated processes take hold. The weapons move onto and through markets, and then to other fights — often arriving in the hands of people who do know how to use them, and are willing to put them to dark use. At this point — weeks, months or years on — the risks multiply.
While it has already been well established that Libya’s stocks of portable antiaircraft missiles have been broken into by rebels in the country’s east, what is less known is how well the now loose missiles might work. The one bit of evidence so far, a photograph by Tyler Hicks, suggests that at least some of the looted stock was manufactured in 1977. Manpads, as these weapons are commonly called, are perishable items, and can become less reliable with the passage of time, the exposure to elements, and, like many munitions, to heat cycling, or the exposure to swings in ambient temperature over time.
One further glimpse from Libya shows that the weapons may be serviceable. Look at the photograph above, filed by Reuters. It shows one of the SA-7s being fired by a Libyan man. In at least this case, the SA-7 was operable enough that the battery cooling unit was able to power the unit’s seeker head, and to start the boost motor that propels the missile free of the launch tube in the opening instant of flight.
Matthew Schroeder, the researcher for the Federation of American Scientists who tracks Manpads proliferation, said that while this image is suggestive that some missiles in Libyan SA-7 stocks may function no matter their advanced age, the image itself falls short of conclusive evidence. In order for the weapon to work, the propellant that would ignite after the missile flew clear of this photograph’s frame would still have to push the missile along at a consistent supersonic speed, and across its full normal range in order to catch up to and strike many classes of targeted aircraft. Whether the Libyan stocks were maintained well enough to perform as designed is not yet clear. That said, the image serves to confirm that worries that the loose weapons might in fact work are justified.
Mr. Schroeder cautioned that the data sample — one photograph — remained small. “One could fire, the next five might not,” he said by telephone from Washington.
About those weapons, the crowd-sourcing request in this morning’s post paid a swift dividend. One reader, publicly identified on the blog only as “Sheep,” quickly provided a helpful document that suggests that the SA-7 Tyler Hicks photographed yesterday was the product of the Soviet Union, and that this particular weapon is the abundant SA-7b variant. In particular, the 9M32M stenciled in the launch tube’s side is the Soviet Union’s product designator for its improved (or “modernized”) SA-7. What is not yet clear is whether other Eastern Bloc manufacturers of the SA-7, for example, Bulgaria, used this product designator as well. If yes, that string of characters might not narrow the search conclusively. All that said, for those interested, I recommend reading the link that Sheep posted on this blog. It’s very informative.
The possible Russian or Soviet origins of the missile stocks visible so far would be unsurprising, given the Kremlin’s long military-to-military engagement with Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi and his military and security services. What also remains unknown is when these missiles entered Libyan possession, and how they might have been stored over the years. We have other images of the weapons’ packaging, which in many cases looks weathered.
Other sources have also been in touch and are helping with the effort to free up full reference keys of markings of Manpads in circulation today. These could prove very helpful, and At War extends a hearty thank-you. Keep the tips coming.
The New York Times