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  • wikileaks: belkheir traite M6 de timide et inexpérimenté et bouteflika en a de plus en plus marre

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001358

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2015
    TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PGOV AG MO WI
    SUBJECT: JULY 3 DISCUSSION OF MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN RELATIONS
    AND WESTERN SAHARA WITH BELKHEIR

    REF: A. STATE 122658
    B. ALGIERS 1250 (NOTAL)

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman; reasons 1.4 (B)(D)

    SUMMARY AND COMMENT
    -------------------

    1. (C) In an extended exchange July 3 with Presidential Chief
    of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador reviewed reftel talking points,
    expressing strong U.S. disappointment over recent setbacks in
    Moroccan-Algerian relations, noting that provocative actions
    from both sides had contributed to the current serious
    impasse, and underscoring the need for restraint and renewed
    efforts at rapprochement. Belkheir reviewed the litany of
    Algerian grievances against Morocco; repeated previous
    arguments that by rejecting the Baker Plan, Morocco had
    missed a chance to resolve the Western Sahara issue in a way
    that would meet its concerns; and initially insisted that
    Algerian references to the Sahrawi right to independence, not
    just self-determination, was a longstanding Algerian
    position. He contrasted this behavior to Algeria's
    unswerving and principled support over the last three decades
    for a UN-based solution to the Western Sahara issue that
    honored the principle of self-determination.


    2. (C) Belkheir also argued that if the United States really
    wanted to help, it should press Morocco to accept the Baker
    Plan, just as Algeria had pressed the Polisario to accept it.
    Belkheir later in the day briefed the Ambassador on
    President Bouteflika's reaction to our demarche. In the
    clearest explanation to date as to why Algerian rhetoric may
    have hardened in recent weeks, Bouteflika said that in the
    context of current unacceptable Moroccan behavior, as long as
    Morocco was rejecting "international legality" by reversing
    its position on the holding of a referendum and by refusing
    to accept Baker, Algeria reserved the right, in reaction, to
    speak about Sahrawi rights to both self-determination and
    independence. Should Morocco accept "international
    legality," Algeria would respond accordingly. In the
    meantime, however, it would not accept a "fait accompli" on
    the Western Sahara. Septel will offer an analysis and
    recommendations, from an Algiers perspective, on how we might
    manage -- and reverse -- the current setback in
    Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement. (End Summary)


    U.S. DISAPPOINTED OVER SETBACK TO
    ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS
    ---------------------------------------

    3. (C) During July 3 morning meeting with Presidential Chief
    of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador expressed strong U.S.
    disappointment over recent setbacks in Moroccan-Algerian
    relations, triggered in part by provocative Algerian
    statements, and underscored the need for both sides to act
    with restraint and renew efforts at rapprochement. Reviewing
    each of the talking points and noting that we understood
    Algerian frustrations, Ambassador argued it that both sides
    had contributed to the current impasse and that it was in
    both sides' interest to get things back on track. Algeria
    and Morocco were neighbors and would always be so, and it
    served neither their interests nor the interests of the
    region to allow the current state of affairs to continue.
    Sooner or later, both sides would have to take up the work of
    resuming rapprochement, as they have periodically done in the
    past, so they might as well resume their efforts sooner
    rather than later. Ambassador emphasized we were counting on
    the vision and statesmanship of President Bouteflika to
    choose a course of action that reflected Algeria's interests
    in regional cooperation and improved relations with Morocco.

    BELKHEIR: ALGERIA CAN'T ENGAGE WHEN MOROCCO
    IS CONTINUING SUCH UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR
    -------------------------------------------

    4. (C) Covering familiar territory, Belkheir reviewed the
    litany of Algerian complaints against Morocco, among other
    things, its rejection of the Baker Plan, its rejection of a
    referendum Morocco had previously agreed to, the extremely
    insulting manner in which the Moroccans had treated the
    Algerian prime minister by abruptly canceling his visit, the
    organization of anti-Algerian demonstrations by the Moroccan
    services, the violent suppression of Sahrawi demonstrators,
    insinuations that Algeria -- as opposed to Moroccan
    stonewalling -- was behind current Sahrawi unrest, inflows of
    Moroccan drugs, which was corrupting Algerian youth. If this
    was the posture Morocco chose to adopt, so be it. Algeria
    did not wish Morocco ill, but it could not engage with
    Morocco if it persisted in taking such positions.
    BELKHEIR: IT'S TOO SOON TO

  • #2
    RESUME RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS
    ----------------------------

    5. (C) Ambassador pushed back, repeating that continued
    tension helped no one and that both sides needed to find a
    way to rebuild confidence and get things back on track.
    Belkheir appeared to take the point but said it was too soon
    to consider such steps. In this regard, he noted that after
    the cancellation of the Ouyahia visit, Moroccan Deputy
    Interior Minister al-Himma had called him to say they needed
    to continue dialogue. Belkheir said he told al-Himma it was
    hard to talk about dialogue in the context of such publicly
    insulting behavior toward the Algerian head of government. At
    the very least, Ambassador rejoined, Algeria should avoid
    steps and declarations that would further complicate the
    situation. Belkheir argued unconvincingly that, in any case,
    both the Polisario letter language and subsequent statements
    reflected longstanding Algerian positions.


    BELKHEIR UNFAVORABLY COMPARES
    CURRENT KING TO HIS FATHER
    ----------------------------

    6. (C) As in their previous conversation (Ref B), Ambassador
    said in the current context the "independence" rhetoric was a
    departure from the rhetoric of at least the last two years,
    which had stressed the right of self-determination, not the
    right to independence. Morocco would never accept
    independence just as the Sahrawi would never accept
    integration. That left autonomy as the only area of possible
    common ground, Ambassador continued. So references to
    independence were not helpful in guiding expectations toward
    realistic outcomes. Belkheir countered that the Baker Plan
    had provided a mechanism to achieve such an outcome by
    allowing all the inhabitants, Moroccan as well as Sahrawi, to
    vote in a referendum. Unfavorably comparing Mohammed VI to
    his father, Belkheir argued the root of the problem was that
    Morocco lacked confidence and strong leadership. Hassan II
    had been a tough adversary.

    7. (C) In the end, Belkheir claimed, Hassan (with whom he met
    many times as a secret emissary) understood what had to be
    done to protect Moroccan interests vis-a-vis the Western
    Sahara. Accordingly, he had accepted a referendum and,
    subsequently, the autonomy approach Baker developed.
    Mohammed VI, by contrast, did not have his father's
    experience, was timid, and was surrounded by unhelpful advisers. As a result, Morocco has rejected previously
    accepted positions and lost an opportunity -- via referendum
    voting procedures that would have allowed all Moroccan
    residents to participate -- to assure the outcome it needed.

    BELKHEIR STRESSES ALGERIA'S PRINCIPLED,
    UNSWERVING SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
    -----------------------------------------

    8. (C) If the United States really wanted to help, it should
    pressure Morocco to abide by UN Security Council resolutions,
    just as Algeria had pressured the Polisario to accept the
    Baker Plan. With some passion, Belkheir emphasized that no
    one had worked harder than he over the years for improved
    relations with Morocco and a settlement of the Western Sahara
    issue. He also stressed the consistency of Algeria's
    position on self-determination over the years, noting Spanish
    Foreign Minister Moratinos' recent testimony that when Spain
    withdrew from the Western Sahara, it had transferred
    administrative responsibilities but not sovereignty to
    Morocco (and Mauritania). He also cited Algeria's principled
    support for East Timorese self-determination, despite its
    very close and sentimental ties with Indonesia stemming from
    its support for Algeria's liberation struggle.

    BELKHEIR DISMISSES ANTI-SETTLEMENT
    ELEMENTS AS UNIMPORTANT IN GUIDING GOA POLICY
    ---------------------------------------------

    9. (C) Ambassador said he had no doubts about Belkheir's
    personal commitment to improve relations and resolve the
    Western Sahara issue in a manner that would address Moroccan
    concerns. However, there were pockets of hardline thinking
    in the FLN as well as Algerian elements who had a vested
    interest in keeping the border closed and profiting from the
    illicit border trade. Belkheir acknowledged that such
    attitudes existed but dismissed them as unimportant,
    insisting that the FLN, and especially minority elements
    within the FLN, did not/not make government policy. As for
    the illicit border trade, the government was acutely aware of
    the problem and beginning to take strong measures against
    those involved. (Note: in fact we have begun to see some
    interesting, relatively high profile anti-corruption
    prosecutions -- see septel.)


    BOUTEFLIKA: HARDENED ALGERIAN RHETORIC A
    RESPONSE TO ATTEMPTED MOROCCAN FAIT ACCOMPLI
    ---------------------------------------------

    10. (C) Later in the day, Belkheir phoned Ambassador to relay
    President Bouteflika's reaction to our demarche earlier in
    the day. In the clearest explanation to date as to why the
    Algerian rhetorical position has hardened, and abandoning all
    pretense that current rhetoric simply reiterated longstanding
    positions, Belkheir explained that Bouteflika had become
    increasingly fed up with Morocco's behavior on the Western
    Sahara. Morocco had reversed its previous acceptance of a
    referendum and had rejected the Baker Plan. In so doing, it
    had rejected international legality. "Tell the Ambassador,"
    Bouteflika instructed Belkheir, "that until Morocco accepted
    this international legality, Algeria reserved the right to
    speak about the right of the Sahrawi people to
    self-determination AND independence." Cutting to the chase
    and echoing comments in a recent interview with a Tunisian
    daily, in which he referred to Moroccan "chantage"
    (blackmail), Bouteflika vowed that Algeria would never accept
    a Moroccan fait accompli on the Western Sahara.
    ERDMAN

    Commentaire


    • #3
      je pense plutôt qu'il est trop timide concernant cette affaire du sahara, couper les relations diplomatique avec l'Algérie et arrêter cette hypocrisie protocolaires....y en a marre de la mollesse de notre gouvernement concernant cette affaire....

      Commentaire


      • #4
        tout a fait d accord avec toi le maroc doit rompre ses relations diplomatique et economiques avec l algerie et arreter cette hipocritie

        Commentaire


        • #5
          pourquoi envoyer un message de félicitation a quelqu'un qui veut couper mon pays en deux....

          Commentaire


          • #6
            wikileaks: belkheir traite M6 de timide et inexpérimenté et bouteflika en a de plus en plus marre
            Ben si c'est wikibidon qu'il le dit alors ca doit être vrai...ca ne vous arrive jamais de mettre en doute ces cables?...ou vous êtes plutôt occuper par vos guegeres algero-marocaine que vous ne vous poser même pas la question...
            (رأيي صحيح يحتمل الخطأ، ورأي غيري خطأ يحتمل الصواب (الامام الشافعي

            Commentaire


            • #7
              Il ne faut pas tomber dans le piège de ce truc wiki machin, il est clair que c'est fait exprès vu la situation dans la région. Divulguer ce genre d'informations en ce moment précis c'est pour faire monter les pays de la région les uns contre les autres, ce qui va nécessiter une intervention des américains pour zaama régler les conflits.
              Tadjére ouala Hadjére ouala rédjline Madjer...

              Vive Tayri, Vive JSK

              Commentaire


              • #8
                je pense plutôt qu'il est trop timide concernant cette affaire du sahara, couper les relations diplomatique avec l'Algérie et arrêter cette hypocrisie protocolaires....y en a marre de la mollesse de notre gouvernement concernant cette affaire....
                M6 ,

                peut être timide ,

                Mais plutôt efficient sur le dossier du sahara.

                C'est bien lui qui a mis les point sur les IIIIIII a l'administration américaine et au reste du monde quand Baker essaya de convaincre le C.S et son administration d'adopter son plan dit "baker 2".

                C'est bien lui qui nous a sorti du carcan du référendum avec l'option indépendance .

                et par ces faits,

                il a inéluctablement renversé la vapeur ou la pression a changé de camps.

                D'ou ces complaintes algériennes.

                Et pour indice,

                il regrette le temps de Hassan 2.

                Commentaire

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