C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001358
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PGOV AG MO WI
SUBJECT: JULY 3 DISCUSSION OF MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN RELATIONS
AND WESTERN SAHARA WITH BELKHEIR
REF: A. STATE 122658
¶B. ALGIERS 1250 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman; reasons 1.4 (B)(D)
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------
1. (C) In an extended exchange July 3 with Presidential Chief
of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador reviewed reftel talking points,
expressing strong U.S. disappointment over recent setbacks in
Moroccan-Algerian relations, noting that provocative actions
from both sides had contributed to the current serious
impasse, and underscoring the need for restraint and renewed
efforts at rapprochement. Belkheir reviewed the litany of
Algerian grievances against Morocco; repeated previous
arguments that by rejecting the Baker Plan, Morocco had
missed a chance to resolve the Western Sahara issue in a way
that would meet its concerns; and initially insisted that
Algerian references to the Sahrawi right to independence, not
just self-determination, was a longstanding Algerian
position. He contrasted this behavior to Algeria's
unswerving and principled support over the last three decades
for a UN-based solution to the Western Sahara issue that
honored the principle of self-determination.
2. (C) Belkheir also argued that if the United States really
wanted to help, it should press Morocco to accept the Baker
Plan, just as Algeria had pressed the Polisario to accept it.
Belkheir later in the day briefed the Ambassador on
President Bouteflika's reaction to our demarche. In the
clearest explanation to date as to why Algerian rhetoric may
have hardened in recent weeks, Bouteflika said that in the
context of current unacceptable Moroccan behavior, as long as
Morocco was rejecting "international legality" by reversing
its position on the holding of a referendum and by refusing
to accept Baker, Algeria reserved the right, in reaction, to
speak about Sahrawi rights to both self-determination and
independence. Should Morocco accept "international
legality," Algeria would respond accordingly. In the
meantime, however, it would not accept a "fait accompli" on
the Western Sahara. Septel will offer an analysis and
recommendations, from an Algiers perspective, on how we might
manage -- and reverse -- the current setback in
Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement. (End Summary)
U.S. DISAPPOINTED OVER SETBACK TO
ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS
---------------------------------------
¶3. (C) During July 3 morning meeting with Presidential Chief
of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador expressed strong U.S.
disappointment over recent setbacks in Moroccan-Algerian
relations, triggered in part by provocative Algerian
statements, and underscored the need for both sides to act
with restraint and renew efforts at rapprochement. Reviewing
each of the talking points and noting that we understood
Algerian frustrations, Ambassador argued it that both sides
had contributed to the current impasse and that it was in
both sides' interest to get things back on track. Algeria
and Morocco were neighbors and would always be so, and it
served neither their interests nor the interests of the
region to allow the current state of affairs to continue.
Sooner or later, both sides would have to take up the work of
resuming rapprochement, as they have periodically done in the
past, so they might as well resume their efforts sooner
rather than later. Ambassador emphasized we were counting on
the vision and statesmanship of President Bouteflika to
choose a course of action that reflected Algeria's interests
in regional cooperation and improved relations with Morocco.
BELKHEIR: ALGERIA CAN'T ENGAGE WHEN MOROCCO
IS CONTINUING SUCH UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Covering familiar territory, Belkheir reviewed the
litany of Algerian complaints against Morocco, among other
things, its rejection of the Baker Plan, its rejection of a
referendum Morocco had previously agreed to, the extremely
insulting manner in which the Moroccans had treated the
Algerian prime minister by abruptly canceling his visit, the
organization of anti-Algerian demonstrations by the Moroccan
services, the violent suppression of Sahrawi demonstrators,
insinuations that Algeria -- as opposed to Moroccan
stonewalling -- was behind current Sahrawi unrest, inflows of
Moroccan drugs, which was corrupting Algerian youth. If this
was the posture Morocco chose to adopt, so be it. Algeria
did not wish Morocco ill, but it could not engage with
Morocco if it persisted in taking such positions.
BELKHEIR: IT'S TOO SOON TO
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PGOV AG MO WI
SUBJECT: JULY 3 DISCUSSION OF MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN RELATIONS
AND WESTERN SAHARA WITH BELKHEIR
REF: A. STATE 122658
¶B. ALGIERS 1250 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman; reasons 1.4 (B)(D)
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------
1. (C) In an extended exchange July 3 with Presidential Chief
of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador reviewed reftel talking points,
expressing strong U.S. disappointment over recent setbacks in
Moroccan-Algerian relations, noting that provocative actions
from both sides had contributed to the current serious
impasse, and underscoring the need for restraint and renewed
efforts at rapprochement. Belkheir reviewed the litany of
Algerian grievances against Morocco; repeated previous
arguments that by rejecting the Baker Plan, Morocco had
missed a chance to resolve the Western Sahara issue in a way
that would meet its concerns; and initially insisted that
Algerian references to the Sahrawi right to independence, not
just self-determination, was a longstanding Algerian
position. He contrasted this behavior to Algeria's
unswerving and principled support over the last three decades
for a UN-based solution to the Western Sahara issue that
honored the principle of self-determination.
2. (C) Belkheir also argued that if the United States really
wanted to help, it should press Morocco to accept the Baker
Plan, just as Algeria had pressed the Polisario to accept it.
Belkheir later in the day briefed the Ambassador on
President Bouteflika's reaction to our demarche. In the
clearest explanation to date as to why Algerian rhetoric may
have hardened in recent weeks, Bouteflika said that in the
context of current unacceptable Moroccan behavior, as long as
Morocco was rejecting "international legality" by reversing
its position on the holding of a referendum and by refusing
to accept Baker, Algeria reserved the right, in reaction, to
speak about Sahrawi rights to both self-determination and
independence. Should Morocco accept "international
legality," Algeria would respond accordingly. In the
meantime, however, it would not accept a "fait accompli" on
the Western Sahara. Septel will offer an analysis and
recommendations, from an Algiers perspective, on how we might
manage -- and reverse -- the current setback in
Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement. (End Summary)
U.S. DISAPPOINTED OVER SETBACK TO
ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS
---------------------------------------
¶3. (C) During July 3 morning meeting with Presidential Chief
of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador expressed strong U.S.
disappointment over recent setbacks in Moroccan-Algerian
relations, triggered in part by provocative Algerian
statements, and underscored the need for both sides to act
with restraint and renew efforts at rapprochement. Reviewing
each of the talking points and noting that we understood
Algerian frustrations, Ambassador argued it that both sides
had contributed to the current impasse and that it was in
both sides' interest to get things back on track. Algeria
and Morocco were neighbors and would always be so, and it
served neither their interests nor the interests of the
region to allow the current state of affairs to continue.
Sooner or later, both sides would have to take up the work of
resuming rapprochement, as they have periodically done in the
past, so they might as well resume their efforts sooner
rather than later. Ambassador emphasized we were counting on
the vision and statesmanship of President Bouteflika to
choose a course of action that reflected Algeria's interests
in regional cooperation and improved relations with Morocco.
BELKHEIR: ALGERIA CAN'T ENGAGE WHEN MOROCCO
IS CONTINUING SUCH UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Covering familiar territory, Belkheir reviewed the
litany of Algerian complaints against Morocco, among other
things, its rejection of the Baker Plan, its rejection of a
referendum Morocco had previously agreed to, the extremely
insulting manner in which the Moroccans had treated the
Algerian prime minister by abruptly canceling his visit, the
organization of anti-Algerian demonstrations by the Moroccan
services, the violent suppression of Sahrawi demonstrators,
insinuations that Algeria -- as opposed to Moroccan
stonewalling -- was behind current Sahrawi unrest, inflows of
Moroccan drugs, which was corrupting Algerian youth. If this
was the posture Morocco chose to adopt, so be it. Algeria
did not wish Morocco ill, but it could not engage with
Morocco if it persisted in taking such positions.
BELKHEIR: IT'S TOO SOON TO
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