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Dans les derniers câbles publies par wikileaks il y a quelques jours, une rencontre en 2008 entre bouteflika, belkhadem et david welch secrétaire adjoint d’état américain. Bouteflika a répété pas mal de fois a david welch qu’il faudra trouver un moyen pour sauver la face a l’algerie concernant le problème du sahara, mais il a insisté quand même sur le plan baker au lieu du plan d’autonomie comme quoi c’est le plan baker qui lui permettrai de sauver la face …
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000251
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2023
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP TOWS WESTERN SAHARA LINE WITH
A/S WELCH
REF: 07 ALGIERS 1069
Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In February 26 and 27 meetings with NEA
Assistant Secretary C. David Welch, President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika and Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem
emphasized their familiar line on self-determination for
Western Sahara, as well as the need to find a way out that
would allow Algeria to "save face." Bouteflika said that
relations with Morocco were "brotherly" and that Western
Sahara was the only issue standing between them. Because
the U.S. was unburdened by the colonial past of France in
the region, Bouteflika felt it was ideally placed to serve
as an informal referee in resolving the dispute. Although
he said he understood Morocco felt threatened by the
prospect of Western Saharan independence, Bouteflika said
that Morocco only had itself to blame for the current
situation, as it had proceeded in a "clumsy" manner. With a more "elegant" touch, he said, Morocco could have
encouraged "a Puerto Rico" outcome, where Sahrawis would
happily choose to remain a part of Morocco in some form.
Welch underlined to the Algerian officials that the U.S.
sought a practical approach that could help the current
negotiations make progress, and the Moroccan autonomy
proposal offered such a possibility. END SUMMARY.
LOVE FOR BAKER PLAN DIES HARD
-----------------------------
¶2. (S) In response to A/S Welch's assertion that the
Moroccan plan served to move a frozen situation forward in
the absence of any alternative, Bouteflika asserted that
the plan of former Secretary of State James Baker was such
an alternative. He told A/S Welch that if another option
was necessary, "self-determination is that alternative" and
the Baker Plan should be discussed. A/S Welch replied that
the Baker plan is dead because it, too, failed to generate
progress. In Bouteflika's view, Baker failed because it
was not given a chance, and he blamed the U.S. for "not
taking its UN Security Council responsibilities
seriously." Bouteflika said the Moroccan plan offered less
autonomy for Western Sahara than an Algerian province
currently enjoys (reftel). He conceded that Algeria does
have influence in Western Sahara, but swore he would not
use it to violate what he sees as international law.
MOROCCAN "CLUMSINESS" TO BLAME
¶3. (S) Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem told A/S Welch on
February 26 that the stability of Morocco was in Algeria's
interest, and that attempting "to transform an
anti-colonial issue" was not the right path to take and was
potentially destabilizing to the region. Bouteflika,
meanwhile, said that he understood Morocco felt threatened
by the prospect of independence for Western Sahara, but
stressed that the Moroccans only had themselves to blame
for current Sahrawi determination. Bouteflika explained,
saying that Morocco could have easily used a more "elegant"
approach to produce a Western Sahara independence that
could be controlled or supervised. Instead, he said, "they
want Anschluss like Saddam Hussein with Kuwait."
Bouteflika said he easily could have imagined an outcome in
which Western Sahara chose to remain a part of Morocco
after seeing the benefits of Moroccan rule, in much the
same way "as Puerto Rico chose to remain part of the U.S."
According to Bouteflika, Morocco needs to offer the
Polisario something, since "you cannot ask concessions from
people who have nothing in their pockets." Had it not been
for Morocco's "clumsy" approach, Bouteflika said "they
could have gotten what they wanted."
ON FRANCE AND U.S.
¶4. (S) Burdened by its colonial history in the Maghreb,
France is unable to play a constructive role in resolving
the Western Sahara dispute, according to Bouteflika.
France "has never really accepted Algerian independence,"
Bouteflika said, and he claimed that France was trying to
settle scores with Algeria by interfering in Western Sahara
ALGIERS 00000251 002 OF 002
in support of Morocco. In contrast, Bouteflika said the
U.S. was an ideal counterweight to balance Morocco, as none
of the parties involved had any bone of contention with the
U.S. Bouteflika complained that the U.S. treats Algeria as
"second class" compared to the preferential treatment it
gives to Tunisia and Morocco. He said the U.S. should
understand Algeria better, as "you also paid a price for
your independence." Belkhadem told A/S Welch of Algeria's
admiration for U.S. positions on the independence of East
Timor and Kosovo. "Why don't you share the same views on
Western Sahara?" asked Belkhadem, "it leaves us wondering
what our U.S. friends want." With both Algerians, A/S
Welch underlined that the U.S. sought practical approaches
that would advance the Western Sahara negotiations
forward. The Moroccan proposal, he noted, offered a
possibility. He urged the Algerians to consider what they
could do to help the current negotiations make concrete
progress.
COMMENT: NEED TO SAVE FACE
5. (S) Bouteflika repeated to A/S Welch several times the
need for Algeria to get itself out of the Western Sahara
dispute in a way that allowed it to "save face." He
reiterated that Algeria "has no claim" at stake, and spoke
of looking towards positive future relations with Morocco,
as "one day we will need to get beyond this." In a
February 27 meeting with Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci,
A/S Welch invited the Algerian delegation to visit
Washington immediately following the next round of
negotiations at Manhasset, to continue the discussions.
¶6. (U) This cable has not been cleared by A/S Welch.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000251
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2023
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP TOWS WESTERN SAHARA LINE WITH
A/S WELCH
REF: 07 ALGIERS 1069
Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In February 26 and 27 meetings with NEA
Assistant Secretary C. David Welch, President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika and Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem
emphasized their familiar line on self-determination for
Western Sahara, as well as the need to find a way out that
would allow Algeria to "save face." Bouteflika said that
relations with Morocco were "brotherly" and that Western
Sahara was the only issue standing between them. Because
the U.S. was unburdened by the colonial past of France in
the region, Bouteflika felt it was ideally placed to serve
as an informal referee in resolving the dispute. Although
he said he understood Morocco felt threatened by the
prospect of Western Saharan independence, Bouteflika said
that Morocco only had itself to blame for the current
situation, as it had proceeded in a "clumsy" manner. With a more "elegant" touch, he said, Morocco could have
encouraged "a Puerto Rico" outcome, where Sahrawis would
happily choose to remain a part of Morocco in some form.
Welch underlined to the Algerian officials that the U.S.
sought a practical approach that could help the current
negotiations make progress, and the Moroccan autonomy
proposal offered such a possibility. END SUMMARY.
LOVE FOR BAKER PLAN DIES HARD
-----------------------------
¶2. (S) In response to A/S Welch's assertion that the
Moroccan plan served to move a frozen situation forward in
the absence of any alternative, Bouteflika asserted that
the plan of former Secretary of State James Baker was such
an alternative. He told A/S Welch that if another option
was necessary, "self-determination is that alternative" and
the Baker Plan should be discussed. A/S Welch replied that
the Baker plan is dead because it, too, failed to generate
progress. In Bouteflika's view, Baker failed because it
was not given a chance, and he blamed the U.S. for "not
taking its UN Security Council responsibilities
seriously." Bouteflika said the Moroccan plan offered less
autonomy for Western Sahara than an Algerian province
currently enjoys (reftel). He conceded that Algeria does
have influence in Western Sahara, but swore he would not
use it to violate what he sees as international law.
MOROCCAN "CLUMSINESS" TO BLAME
¶3. (S) Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem told A/S Welch on
February 26 that the stability of Morocco was in Algeria's
interest, and that attempting "to transform an
anti-colonial issue" was not the right path to take and was
potentially destabilizing to the region. Bouteflika,
meanwhile, said that he understood Morocco felt threatened
by the prospect of independence for Western Sahara, but
stressed that the Moroccans only had themselves to blame
for current Sahrawi determination. Bouteflika explained,
saying that Morocco could have easily used a more "elegant"
approach to produce a Western Sahara independence that
could be controlled or supervised. Instead, he said, "they
want Anschluss like Saddam Hussein with Kuwait."
Bouteflika said he easily could have imagined an outcome in
which Western Sahara chose to remain a part of Morocco
after seeing the benefits of Moroccan rule, in much the
same way "as Puerto Rico chose to remain part of the U.S."
According to Bouteflika, Morocco needs to offer the
Polisario something, since "you cannot ask concessions from
people who have nothing in their pockets." Had it not been
for Morocco's "clumsy" approach, Bouteflika said "they
could have gotten what they wanted."
ON FRANCE AND U.S.
¶4. (S) Burdened by its colonial history in the Maghreb,
France is unable to play a constructive role in resolving
the Western Sahara dispute, according to Bouteflika.
France "has never really accepted Algerian independence,"
Bouteflika said, and he claimed that France was trying to
settle scores with Algeria by interfering in Western Sahara
ALGIERS 00000251 002 OF 002
in support of Morocco. In contrast, Bouteflika said the
U.S. was an ideal counterweight to balance Morocco, as none
of the parties involved had any bone of contention with the
U.S. Bouteflika complained that the U.S. treats Algeria as
"second class" compared to the preferential treatment it
gives to Tunisia and Morocco. He said the U.S. should
understand Algeria better, as "you also paid a price for
your independence." Belkhadem told A/S Welch of Algeria's
admiration for U.S. positions on the independence of East
Timor and Kosovo. "Why don't you share the same views on
Western Sahara?" asked Belkhadem, "it leaves us wondering
what our U.S. friends want." With both Algerians, A/S
Welch underlined that the U.S. sought practical approaches
that would advance the Western Sahara negotiations
forward. The Moroccan proposal, he noted, offered a
possibility. He urged the Algerians to consider what they
could do to help the current negotiations make concrete
progress.
COMMENT: NEED TO SAVE FACE
5. (S) Bouteflika repeated to A/S Welch several times the
need for Algeria to get itself out of the Western Sahara
dispute in a way that allowed it to "save face." He
reiterated that Algeria "has no claim" at stake, and spoke
of looking towards positive future relations with Morocco,
as "one day we will need to get beyond this." In a
February 27 meeting with Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci,
A/S Welch invited the Algerian delegation to visit
Washington immediately following the next round of
negotiations at Manhasset, to continue the discussions.
¶6. (U) This cable has not been cleared by A/S Welch.
tout s’achète!
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