Réseau Wikileaks : Le Commandant Saleh L'officier algérien qui a détourné le plus de fonds en Algérie.
N AILING AND FRAGILE ALGERIAN REGIME DRIFTS INTO 2008
Date:2007 December 19, 12:06 (Wednesday) Canonical ID:07ALGIERS1806_a
Original Classification:SECRET Current Classification:SECRET
Handling Restrictions-- Not Assigned --
Character Count:14428
Executive Order:-- Not Assigned -- Locator:TEXT ONLINE
TAGS:AG - Algeria | PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PINS - Political Affairs--Internal Security Concepts:-- Not Assigned --
Enclosure:-- Not Assigned -- Type:TE - Telegram (cable)
Office Origin:-- N/A or Blank --
Office Action:-- N/A or Blank -- Archive Status:-- Not Assigned --
From:Algeria Algiers Markings:-- Not Assigned --
To:France Paris | Libya Tripoli | Mali Bamako | Mauritania Nouakchott | Morocco Casablanca | Morocco Rabat | Niger Niamey | Secretary of State | Spain Madrid | Tunisia Tunis | United States European Command
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B. ALGIERS 1618
C. ALGIERS 1237
D. ALGIERS 1658
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent discussions with former government
officials, long-term opposition leaders and journalists paint
a picture of an Algerian regime that is fragile in ways it
has not been before, plagued by a lack of vision,
unprecedented levels of corruption and rumblings of division
within the military rank and file. Our Algerian contacts are
often a grumpy lot, but we now hear more than the ordinary
amount of concern about the GOA's inability or unwillingness
to address political, economic and security problems. The
December 11 suicide bombings in Algiers, carried out by two
men amnestied under the Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation, have ignited heated debate about the ability
of President Bouteflika's reconciliation program to protect
the country. The debate pits proponents of an urgent and
aggressive approach to the terrorist threat against those
aligned with Bouteflika who still believe that amnesty has a
role to play. The picture of an isolated president, a
stagnant reform process and an uncertain approach towards
terror comes at a time when efforts within the government to
engineer a third term for Bouteflika are gathering steam. We
do not sense an explosion coming right away. Instead, we see
a government drifting and groping for a way forward. END
SUMMARY.
SHIP OF STATE ADRIFT
--------------------
2. (C) On December 3, opposition Rally for Culture and
Democracy (RCD) leader Said Sadi presented a somber overview
of the Algerian regime, saying it insisted on continued
control but lacked vision and capacity. Sadi warned that in
the context of current stagnation in economic and political
reform, Algeria's institutions were corroding from within,
losing many of their best cadres of workers and civil
servants. The former leader of the Islamist al-Islah party,
Abdallah Djaballah, who was ousted from the party's
leadership with active help from the Interior Ministry,
pointed out to us on December 17 that the harraga phenomenon
(ref A), in which youth flee on makeshift crafts to Europe,
was no longer limited only to poor, unemployed youth.
Djaballah viewed Algerian youth as having a choice "between
death at sea and a slow, gradual death at home" given the
profound lack of opportunities in the country's stagnant
economy. Sadi told us he was shocked to find so many
educated, middle-class Algerians in Quebec and parts of the
U.S. on a recent visit. "Those people are the future of
Algeria," Sadi said.
3. (C) Mounir Boudjema director general of the
(anti-Islamist) French-language daily Liberte, told us
December 17 that when it came to national reconciliation, the
December 11 bombings had polarized the debate within the
Algerian security services, with an increasing number of
voices favoring a tougher approach. Boudjema said that the
regime had no single, clear approach to fighting terror, a
fact proven by its indecisiveness on how to handle
high-profile amnesty cases such as that of Hassan Hattab (ref
B). According to Sadi and Boudjema ordinary Algerians, who
have already lost confidence in the economic and political
reform agenda, are now losing faith in the ability of the
regime to protect them. Laila Aslaoui, a former minister,
women's rights activist and writer, told Ambassador at dinner
December 18 that much of Algerian society was demobilizing
against the terror threat. It was scandalous that the
Interior Ministry knew the Supreme Court was a target and did
nothing to improve the building's security or warn the
public, she claimed. She was caustic about the Interior
Minister's comment that it was impossible to provide complete
protection against bomb attacks, wondering why the GOA does
not more vigorously pursue terrorist suspects. The GOA had
asked Ms. Aslaoui on December 17 to help organize a march
condemning terrorism. In the 1990s, she said she would not
have hesitated. Now, she remarked bitterly, she would do
nothing that helps the Algerian government justify its
approach to security. Similarly, Haithem Rabbani (protect),
ALGIERS 00001806 002 OF 004
a long-time journalist contact, told Ambassador December 17
that there is a growing gap between what ordinary Algerians
see as their key needs and what they perceive the government
is offering in terms of wages and quality of life. As a
result, he said, fewer Algerians are willing to help the
government. The word on the street, he said, is that if you
have to do business in a government office, go but then leave
promptly and stay out of the way.
4. (C) On the other hand, Djaballah told us that widespread
disenchantment about the government's willingness to share
power with Islamists ultimately prompted Algerian Islamists
to heed calls by his and other Islamist parties to boycott
the November 29 local elections. They understand, he said,
that the new electoral law (ref C) was designed to
marginalize them and perpetuate the ruling coalition's grip
on power. Closing out political space will merely spur more
extremism, he warned. The Ambassador told Djaballah that the
U.S. favors political liberalization in Algeria but we also
understand that this may have to be done gradually. The U.S.
does not want to see a return to the violence of the 1990s
and is working with the GOA against those who actively seek
it. He welcomed Djaballah's effort to play in the legal
political system. The important point, the Ambassador
underlined, is that while political evolution might be slow
it needs to be in a steady direction of liberalization.
Djaballah accepted the point and appreciated our having
raised election process problems with the GOA.
A RULING "GANG FROM TIKRIT"
---------------------------
5. (C) Commenting on the stability of the country, Boudjema
stressed that Algerians "have been through far worse than
this," and that internal divisions should not be mistaken for
instability. The regime, Boudjema pointed out, values
stability above all else, and is consequently both fragile
and stable at the same time. Boudjema agreed with an analogy
made by Sadi both to us and publicly in the press, comparing
the Bouteflika government to "a gang from Tikrit" in which a
disproportionate number of cabinet ministers and generals
came from the same region in the western province of Tlemcen
as President Bouteflika. (Indeed, many in the inner circle
come from the small town of Nedrumah.) The loyalty of this
"gang," according to Boudjema and Sadi, is key to maintaining
stability, just as it did in Saddamn Hussein's Iraq.
N AILING AND FRAGILE ALGERIAN REGIME DRIFTS INTO 2008
Date:2007 December 19, 12:06 (Wednesday) Canonical ID:07ALGIERS1806_a
Original Classification:SECRET Current Classification:SECRET
Handling Restrictions-- Not Assigned --
Character Count:14428
Executive Order:-- Not Assigned -- Locator:TEXT ONLINE
TAGS:AG - Algeria | PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PINS - Political Affairs--Internal Security Concepts:-- Not Assigned --
Enclosure:-- Not Assigned -- Type:TE - Telegram (cable)
Office Origin:-- N/A or Blank --
Office Action:-- N/A or Blank -- Archive Status:-- Not Assigned --
From:Algeria Algiers Markings:-- Not Assigned --
To:France Paris | Libya Tripoli | Mali Bamako | Mauritania Nouakchott | Morocco Casablanca | Morocco Rabat | Niger Niamey | Secretary of State | Spain Madrid | Tunisia Tunis | United States European Command
ContentRaw contentMetadataPrintShare
Show Headers
B. ALGIERS 1618
C. ALGIERS 1237
D. ALGIERS 1658
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent discussions with former government
officials, long-term opposition leaders and journalists paint
a picture of an Algerian regime that is fragile in ways it
has not been before, plagued by a lack of vision,
unprecedented levels of corruption and rumblings of division
within the military rank and file. Our Algerian contacts are
often a grumpy lot, but we now hear more than the ordinary
amount of concern about the GOA's inability or unwillingness
to address political, economic and security problems. The
December 11 suicide bombings in Algiers, carried out by two
men amnestied under the Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation, have ignited heated debate about the ability
of President Bouteflika's reconciliation program to protect
the country. The debate pits proponents of an urgent and
aggressive approach to the terrorist threat against those
aligned with Bouteflika who still believe that amnesty has a
role to play. The picture of an isolated president, a
stagnant reform process and an uncertain approach towards
terror comes at a time when efforts within the government to
engineer a third term for Bouteflika are gathering steam. We
do not sense an explosion coming right away. Instead, we see
a government drifting and groping for a way forward. END
SUMMARY.
SHIP OF STATE ADRIFT
--------------------
2. (C) On December 3, opposition Rally for Culture and
Democracy (RCD) leader Said Sadi presented a somber overview
of the Algerian regime, saying it insisted on continued
control but lacked vision and capacity. Sadi warned that in
the context of current stagnation in economic and political
reform, Algeria's institutions were corroding from within,
losing many of their best cadres of workers and civil
servants. The former leader of the Islamist al-Islah party,
Abdallah Djaballah, who was ousted from the party's
leadership with active help from the Interior Ministry,
pointed out to us on December 17 that the harraga phenomenon
(ref A), in which youth flee on makeshift crafts to Europe,
was no longer limited only to poor, unemployed youth.
Djaballah viewed Algerian youth as having a choice "between
death at sea and a slow, gradual death at home" given the
profound lack of opportunities in the country's stagnant
economy. Sadi told us he was shocked to find so many
educated, middle-class Algerians in Quebec and parts of the
U.S. on a recent visit. "Those people are the future of
Algeria," Sadi said.
3. (C) Mounir Boudjema director general of the
(anti-Islamist) French-language daily Liberte, told us
December 17 that when it came to national reconciliation, the
December 11 bombings had polarized the debate within the
Algerian security services, with an increasing number of
voices favoring a tougher approach. Boudjema said that the
regime had no single, clear approach to fighting terror, a
fact proven by its indecisiveness on how to handle
high-profile amnesty cases such as that of Hassan Hattab (ref
B). According to Sadi and Boudjema ordinary Algerians, who
have already lost confidence in the economic and political
reform agenda, are now losing faith in the ability of the
regime to protect them. Laila Aslaoui, a former minister,
women's rights activist and writer, told Ambassador at dinner
December 18 that much of Algerian society was demobilizing
against the terror threat. It was scandalous that the
Interior Ministry knew the Supreme Court was a target and did
nothing to improve the building's security or warn the
public, she claimed. She was caustic about the Interior
Minister's comment that it was impossible to provide complete
protection against bomb attacks, wondering why the GOA does
not more vigorously pursue terrorist suspects. The GOA had
asked Ms. Aslaoui on December 17 to help organize a march
condemning terrorism. In the 1990s, she said she would not
have hesitated. Now, she remarked bitterly, she would do
nothing that helps the Algerian government justify its
approach to security. Similarly, Haithem Rabbani (protect),
ALGIERS 00001806 002 OF 004
a long-time journalist contact, told Ambassador December 17
that there is a growing gap between what ordinary Algerians
see as their key needs and what they perceive the government
is offering in terms of wages and quality of life. As a
result, he said, fewer Algerians are willing to help the
government. The word on the street, he said, is that if you
have to do business in a government office, go but then leave
promptly and stay out of the way.
4. (C) On the other hand, Djaballah told us that widespread
disenchantment about the government's willingness to share
power with Islamists ultimately prompted Algerian Islamists
to heed calls by his and other Islamist parties to boycott
the November 29 local elections. They understand, he said,
that the new electoral law (ref C) was designed to
marginalize them and perpetuate the ruling coalition's grip
on power. Closing out political space will merely spur more
extremism, he warned. The Ambassador told Djaballah that the
U.S. favors political liberalization in Algeria but we also
understand that this may have to be done gradually. The U.S.
does not want to see a return to the violence of the 1990s
and is working with the GOA against those who actively seek
it. He welcomed Djaballah's effort to play in the legal
political system. The important point, the Ambassador
underlined, is that while political evolution might be slow
it needs to be in a steady direction of liberalization.
Djaballah accepted the point and appreciated our having
raised election process problems with the GOA.
A RULING "GANG FROM TIKRIT"
---------------------------
5. (C) Commenting on the stability of the country, Boudjema
stressed that Algerians "have been through far worse than
this," and that internal divisions should not be mistaken for
instability. The regime, Boudjema pointed out, values
stability above all else, and is consequently both fragile
and stable at the same time. Boudjema agreed with an analogy
made by Sadi both to us and publicly in the press, comparing
the Bouteflika government to "a gang from Tikrit" in which a
disproportionate number of cabinet ministers and generals
came from the same region in the western province of Tlemcen
as President Bouteflika. (Indeed, many in the inner circle
come from the small town of Nedrumah.) The loyalty of this
"gang," according to Boudjema and Sadi, is key to maintaining
stability, just as it did in Saddamn Hussein's Iraq.
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