By Claudia Wright
The mystery that Michael Ledeen has presented to investigators looking into the role he played in the Iranian arms affair is not likely to last for much longer. But it is characteristic of the man who has made a business of trading on his political connections that a reputation for mysterious links to the US, Israeli, and European governments has helped to attract corporate clients seeking inside knowledge of Reagan administration decision-making. The identity and extent of those private interests, and whether Ledeen complied with US law in disclosing them, have become a new focus of investigation into the arms scandal.
Ledeen has been playing cat and mouse with the US press, contriving offers of exclusive information to favored journalists, and slamming the telephone down on those he suspects may be unsympathetic. He has refused to speak with Washington reporters of one New York newspaper because it had published an article calling into question the motives behind Ledeen's involvement in the negotiations with Iran.
Ambiguities concerning Ledeen abound. He is the crux of Israel's cover story that it became the go-between in the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal at the behest of the US, represented by Michael Ledeen. Former White House national security adviser Robert McFarlane reported at that time, however, that Ledeen had gone to Israel in May 1985 "on his own hook." On that visit, according to Ledeen's own testimony, he met with Prime Minister Shimon Peres. McFarlane reported at the time that Ledeen returned with a proposal from Peres. Further, the preliminary report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence makes it clear that it was Ledeen who twice helped keep the initiative alive, telling McFarlane that he could make contact with Manucher Ghorbanifar because he would be in Israel on vacation and, another time, in Europe on other business anyway. Perhaps Ledeen's most astounding statement, in a recentWashington Post interview, was: "I have never been particularly active in Jewish affairs and I don't have particularly close ties with Israel."
Ledeen, in fact, is a founding director of the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs (JINSA), a cornerstone of Israel's ongoing campaign to obtain the latest and best of US weapons in the largest possible quantities. And his lack of "close ties" with Israel did not preclude him from ready access to Israel's Prime Minister. Nor did it prevent him from taking his family twice to Israel for month-long stays in quarters provided at special rates by the Jerusalem Foundation, an Israeli private fund. He also toured Lebanon as a guest of the Israeli armed forces after the 1982 invasion by Israel.
At the time the arms scandal broke in late 1986, the 45-year-old Michael Ledeen was appearing with increasing frequency on US television news shows as an expert on terrorism. It was a far cry from his departure 15 years earlier from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, when he was denied tenure after teaching history there. He went from St. Louis to Rome in 1974 and returned to the US in 1977 to edit the Washington Quarterly, a publication of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which generally takes a strongly pro-Israel stance.
While at CSIS, Ledeen apparently drew on contacts with the Italian intelligence service (for which he was a paid consultant in 1980) to develop, in collaboration with journalist Arnaud De Borchgrave, an article exposing Billy Carter's relationship with the Libyans. Publication of the story was designed to embarrass President Carter in his re-election campaign and to force prosecution of Billy Carter for failing to comply with the Foreign Agents Registration Act. It is ironic that, seven years later, Ledeen's activities should raise the question of whether he too should be prosecuted for failing to register as a foreign agent.
When the Reagan administration took office, Ledeen was hired by Secretary of State Alexander Haig as a full-time assistant. This lasted until Haig's departure from State in mid-1982. At the time, State Department officials say, Ledeen's GS-15 rank was so modest he was not obliged to file the public financial disclosure form required by US law. Ledeen was then hired by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, as a consultant. State Department records show that Ledeen was paid for a total of 135 days over a period of two and a half years. In May of 1984, Eagleburger left State to join Kissinger Associates, the New York consulting firm. Eagleburger's successor as Under Secretary, Michael Armacost, did not use Ledeen and State Department records show that he received no payment for consulting in 1985 or early 1986. For that reason, Armacost says, he removed Ledeen's name from the State Department's roster of consultants.
At the same time, however, Ledeen was serving both the Pentagon and the White House. Pentagon records show that starting in 1983, and continuing to August 1985, Ledeen was paid a consulting rate of $221 per day for a maximum of 90 days per year—the exact number of days he was paid has not been confirmed. At first, Ledeen reported to Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and then to Armitage's principal deputy, Noel Koch. Koch had been the Washington lobbyist for the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) until he joined the Pentagon in 1981. He was in charge of counter-terrorism planning for the Pentagon, and he and Armitage are both identified in the Senate Intelligence Committee report as having participated in high-level decisions on shipping US arms to Iran. Pentagon records show that Ledeen's name was removed from its consultants' roster in December 1986, and that he did no paid work as a consultant after August 1985.
Pentagon records also reveal that in 1984 Ledeen secured a research contract over initial objections by some officials. The contract proposal to write a report on European attitudes towards Central American defense was originally submitted by Ledeen in late 1983 in conjunction with the CSIS. When it was turned down, he produced a new proposal, at a substantially reduced price, under the auspices of his own consulting firm, ISI. This was approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred Ikle. For a period of six months, Ledeen was paid a total of $67,000. According to Simon Serfaty, an old academic friend of Ledeen's who worked with him on the project, the two traveled to Europe in 1984 to interview European officials. Ledeen has received no further contract award since then.
The mystery that Michael Ledeen has presented to investigators looking into the role he played in the Iranian arms affair is not likely to last for much longer. But it is characteristic of the man who has made a business of trading on his political connections that a reputation for mysterious links to the US, Israeli, and European governments has helped to attract corporate clients seeking inside knowledge of Reagan administration decision-making. The identity and extent of those private interests, and whether Ledeen complied with US law in disclosing them, have become a new focus of investigation into the arms scandal.
Ledeen has been playing cat and mouse with the US press, contriving offers of exclusive information to favored journalists, and slamming the telephone down on those he suspects may be unsympathetic. He has refused to speak with Washington reporters of one New York newspaper because it had published an article calling into question the motives behind Ledeen's involvement in the negotiations with Iran.
Ambiguities concerning Ledeen abound. He is the crux of Israel's cover story that it became the go-between in the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal at the behest of the US, represented by Michael Ledeen. Former White House national security adviser Robert McFarlane reported at that time, however, that Ledeen had gone to Israel in May 1985 "on his own hook." On that visit, according to Ledeen's own testimony, he met with Prime Minister Shimon Peres. McFarlane reported at the time that Ledeen returned with a proposal from Peres. Further, the preliminary report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence makes it clear that it was Ledeen who twice helped keep the initiative alive, telling McFarlane that he could make contact with Manucher Ghorbanifar because he would be in Israel on vacation and, another time, in Europe on other business anyway. Perhaps Ledeen's most astounding statement, in a recentWashington Post interview, was: "I have never been particularly active in Jewish affairs and I don't have particularly close ties with Israel."
Ledeen, in fact, is a founding director of the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs (JINSA), a cornerstone of Israel's ongoing campaign to obtain the latest and best of US weapons in the largest possible quantities. And his lack of "close ties" with Israel did not preclude him from ready access to Israel's Prime Minister. Nor did it prevent him from taking his family twice to Israel for month-long stays in quarters provided at special rates by the Jerusalem Foundation, an Israeli private fund. He also toured Lebanon as a guest of the Israeli armed forces after the 1982 invasion by Israel.
At the time the arms scandal broke in late 1986, the 45-year-old Michael Ledeen was appearing with increasing frequency on US television news shows as an expert on terrorism. It was a far cry from his departure 15 years earlier from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, when he was denied tenure after teaching history there. He went from St. Louis to Rome in 1974 and returned to the US in 1977 to edit the Washington Quarterly, a publication of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which generally takes a strongly pro-Israel stance.
While at CSIS, Ledeen apparently drew on contacts with the Italian intelligence service (for which he was a paid consultant in 1980) to develop, in collaboration with journalist Arnaud De Borchgrave, an article exposing Billy Carter's relationship with the Libyans. Publication of the story was designed to embarrass President Carter in his re-election campaign and to force prosecution of Billy Carter for failing to comply with the Foreign Agents Registration Act. It is ironic that, seven years later, Ledeen's activities should raise the question of whether he too should be prosecuted for failing to register as a foreign agent.
When the Reagan administration took office, Ledeen was hired by Secretary of State Alexander Haig as a full-time assistant. This lasted until Haig's departure from State in mid-1982. At the time, State Department officials say, Ledeen's GS-15 rank was so modest he was not obliged to file the public financial disclosure form required by US law. Ledeen was then hired by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, as a consultant. State Department records show that Ledeen was paid for a total of 135 days over a period of two and a half years. In May of 1984, Eagleburger left State to join Kissinger Associates, the New York consulting firm. Eagleburger's successor as Under Secretary, Michael Armacost, did not use Ledeen and State Department records show that he received no payment for consulting in 1985 or early 1986. For that reason, Armacost says, he removed Ledeen's name from the State Department's roster of consultants.
At the same time, however, Ledeen was serving both the Pentagon and the White House. Pentagon records show that starting in 1983, and continuing to August 1985, Ledeen was paid a consulting rate of $221 per day for a maximum of 90 days per year—the exact number of days he was paid has not been confirmed. At first, Ledeen reported to Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and then to Armitage's principal deputy, Noel Koch. Koch had been the Washington lobbyist for the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) until he joined the Pentagon in 1981. He was in charge of counter-terrorism planning for the Pentagon, and he and Armitage are both identified in the Senate Intelligence Committee report as having participated in high-level decisions on shipping US arms to Iran. Pentagon records show that Ledeen's name was removed from its consultants' roster in December 1986, and that he did no paid work as a consultant after August 1985.
Pentagon records also reveal that in 1984 Ledeen secured a research contract over initial objections by some officials. The contract proposal to write a report on European attitudes towards Central American defense was originally submitted by Ledeen in late 1983 in conjunction with the CSIS. When it was turned down, he produced a new proposal, at a substantially reduced price, under the auspices of his own consulting firm, ISI. This was approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred Ikle. For a period of six months, Ledeen was paid a total of $67,000. According to Simon Serfaty, an old academic friend of Ledeen's who worked with him on the project, the two traveled to Europe in 1984 to interview European officials. Ledeen has received no further contract award since then.
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