The Manhasset Wagers
Mohammad el-Ashab Al-Hayat - 16/03/08/
The Islamic Summit in Dakar failed to bring together the Moroccan King Mohammad VI and the Algerian President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika for a roundtable dialogue. Most likely, a summit between the two had never been planned, not only because the Organization of the Islamic Conference does not deal only with the Western Sahara conflict, but also because the standpoints of the two neighboring countries on regional and bilateral issues have grown increasingly divergent. One of the most memorable events was that which took place during the Islamic Summit held in Taef, over a quarter-century ago: the first public and historical handshake between late Moroccan King Hassan II and then Algerian President Al Chazli Bin Jadid in the holy city of Mecca. The positive developments that began to take shape then were soon to fade away, due to the absence of one of the main elements of the dialogue.
Today, the matter seems different, particularly with regard to the fourth round of negotiations in Manhasset, with reasoning similar to believing illusions, the most credible of which, politically speaking, is that direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario may achieve what the abandoned dialogue between Rabat and Algiers failed to deliver. Perhaps the cornerstone in both past and future negotiations may have been a concealed wager on failure. Just as it is not possible for Algeria to be entirely reassured at a possible agreement between Morocco and the Polisario, one likely to keep it out of the final political arrangement, it would be impossible for Morocco to consider such an agreement in the absence of Algerian approval.
Since the beginning, they have been going their separate ways. Moroccan diplomacy in the 1970s had intentionally kept Algeria out of the negotiations with Spain, the former colonizer of the Western Sahara, on the basis of historical and legal rights sanctioned by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The fact is that certain "political rights" urge it today to make Algeria a party in the arrangement. What has indeed occurred is that the Western Sahara conflict, which many saw as just another round, delving into the depths of history, has, after more than thirty years, turned into a pool of growing tensions that has severely undermined the ties of geographical proximity. As a result, no one today can conceive of a peaceful solution without significantly increasing the roles of all parties concerned.
The fourth round of negotiations in Manhasset, which begins today, will in any event differ from the previous series of talks. The various parties, most particularly Morocco and the Polisario, since Algeria and Mauritania have merely made an official show of presence, will present a legal and political reading of the contents of relevant Security Council resolutions. Outside the negotiation table, preparations are being made for actual confrontation, especially since the desert region of Tifariti came near to enflaming passions. Despite being a small unpopulated outpost, Tifariti has been intentionally transformed into a potential frontline for military confrontation between Morocco and Algeria. Undoubtedly, it would not have been chosen as a buffer-zone without the agreement of the two neighboring countries. In the early 1990s, coinciding with the application of the cease-fire agreement, Moroccan-Algerian relation had gone beyond an outstanding period of respite, not the least on the military level, as the Moroccan army had completed the erection of a massive security wall around the Sahara without encountering difficulties.
The buffer-zone issue has been added to the agenda of the Manhasset negotiations, despite the fact that it was initially aimed at implementing Security Council resolutions that urge both parties, as well as neighboring countries, to engage in direct negotiations in order to reach a political solution to the conflict. Consequently, the current escalation could be interpreted as a means of encouraging the parties to rally around the core issues of the negotiations, considering that the United Nations and its delegation to the Western Sahara (MINURSO) have endorsed a cease-fire in the battlefield, and that relevant agreements have more clearly addressed the issue of banning all forms of civilian or military presence in the buffer-zone.
Between escalation being a mere tactic that ignores the core issues of agreement, and a means of consolidating the situation, there is a major difference in interpretation. Most likely, the Manhasset negotiations are merely a political front for negotiations taking place in the language of war. In any case, surveying landmines from a distance does not allow one to measure the risks of actually approaching them. Similarly, breaching the buffer-zone with norms of legality and circumstances of politics signifies little more than a call to arms. The United Nations has sought for and fully supported a clear political solution that would alone be likely to spare the Manhasset negotiations the risks of failure. For the concerned parties to live up to the confidence and political wager of the United Nations, they should at least reflect the will of the people of the region to regain long-lost peace. For even if they have no interest in making the necessary progress, they should at least bear in mind the presence of tens of thousands of nationals of Saharan origin who can no longer be used as hostages in an outdated agenda.
Mohammad el-Ashab Al-Hayat - 16/03/08/
The Islamic Summit in Dakar failed to bring together the Moroccan King Mohammad VI and the Algerian President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika for a roundtable dialogue. Most likely, a summit between the two had never been planned, not only because the Organization of the Islamic Conference does not deal only with the Western Sahara conflict, but also because the standpoints of the two neighboring countries on regional and bilateral issues have grown increasingly divergent. One of the most memorable events was that which took place during the Islamic Summit held in Taef, over a quarter-century ago: the first public and historical handshake between late Moroccan King Hassan II and then Algerian President Al Chazli Bin Jadid in the holy city of Mecca. The positive developments that began to take shape then were soon to fade away, due to the absence of one of the main elements of the dialogue.
Today, the matter seems different, particularly with regard to the fourth round of negotiations in Manhasset, with reasoning similar to believing illusions, the most credible of which, politically speaking, is that direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario may achieve what the abandoned dialogue between Rabat and Algiers failed to deliver. Perhaps the cornerstone in both past and future negotiations may have been a concealed wager on failure. Just as it is not possible for Algeria to be entirely reassured at a possible agreement between Morocco and the Polisario, one likely to keep it out of the final political arrangement, it would be impossible for Morocco to consider such an agreement in the absence of Algerian approval.
Since the beginning, they have been going their separate ways. Moroccan diplomacy in the 1970s had intentionally kept Algeria out of the negotiations with Spain, the former colonizer of the Western Sahara, on the basis of historical and legal rights sanctioned by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The fact is that certain "political rights" urge it today to make Algeria a party in the arrangement. What has indeed occurred is that the Western Sahara conflict, which many saw as just another round, delving into the depths of history, has, after more than thirty years, turned into a pool of growing tensions that has severely undermined the ties of geographical proximity. As a result, no one today can conceive of a peaceful solution without significantly increasing the roles of all parties concerned.
The fourth round of negotiations in Manhasset, which begins today, will in any event differ from the previous series of talks. The various parties, most particularly Morocco and the Polisario, since Algeria and Mauritania have merely made an official show of presence, will present a legal and political reading of the contents of relevant Security Council resolutions. Outside the negotiation table, preparations are being made for actual confrontation, especially since the desert region of Tifariti came near to enflaming passions. Despite being a small unpopulated outpost, Tifariti has been intentionally transformed into a potential frontline for military confrontation between Morocco and Algeria. Undoubtedly, it would not have been chosen as a buffer-zone without the agreement of the two neighboring countries. In the early 1990s, coinciding with the application of the cease-fire agreement, Moroccan-Algerian relation had gone beyond an outstanding period of respite, not the least on the military level, as the Moroccan army had completed the erection of a massive security wall around the Sahara without encountering difficulties.
The buffer-zone issue has been added to the agenda of the Manhasset negotiations, despite the fact that it was initially aimed at implementing Security Council resolutions that urge both parties, as well as neighboring countries, to engage in direct negotiations in order to reach a political solution to the conflict. Consequently, the current escalation could be interpreted as a means of encouraging the parties to rally around the core issues of the negotiations, considering that the United Nations and its delegation to the Western Sahara (MINURSO) have endorsed a cease-fire in the battlefield, and that relevant agreements have more clearly addressed the issue of banning all forms of civilian or military presence in the buffer-zone.
Between escalation being a mere tactic that ignores the core issues of agreement, and a means of consolidating the situation, there is a major difference in interpretation. Most likely, the Manhasset negotiations are merely a political front for negotiations taking place in the language of war. In any case, surveying landmines from a distance does not allow one to measure the risks of actually approaching them. Similarly, breaching the buffer-zone with norms of legality and circumstances of politics signifies little more than a call to arms. The United Nations has sought for and fully supported a clear political solution that would alone be likely to spare the Manhasset negotiations the risks of failure. For the concerned parties to live up to the confidence and political wager of the United Nations, they should at least reflect the will of the people of the region to regain long-lost peace. For even if they have no interest in making the necessary progress, they should at least bear in mind the presence of tens of thousands of nationals of Saharan origin who can no longer be used as hostages in an outdated agenda.
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