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Voir la version complète : La crise des mig29 vu par un magazine strategique russe


absent
25/10/2008, 19h12
Crisis: Algeria Refuses Delivery of MiG-29SMT Fighters



Konstantin Makienko



Facts

The contract for the delivery of 28 MiG-29SMT fighters and six MiG-29UBT trainers worth 1.27 billion USD to Algeria was signed in late January and entered into force in March of 2006, during the visit of President Putin. At that time, Russia agreed to write off 4.7 billion USD worth of Algerian debt in exchange for the purchase of an equivalent value of arms and military equipment. The MiG-29 contract was thus just one of a large package of agreements, which included the delivery of 28 multi-role Su-MKI(A) fighters for 1.5 billion USD, 16 Yak-130 fighter-trainers for 200 million USD (Algeria was the first to purchase these trainers), about eight S-300PMU-2 SAMs, 185 T-90S tanks, a PantsirS1 air defense system, and maintenance and upgrades of Algeria’s armoured vehicles and ships.

This was the first time that of Russia’s military-technical cooperation with foreign states involved a “trade-in,” whereby MiG Corporation agreed to buy back a few dozen MiG-29 and perhaps MiG-23 at depreciated book value. It is perhaps for this reason that Russian media initially estimated the value of the contract at 1.8 billion USD. The total value of the package of contracts signed between December 2005 and January 2006 amounted to 7.5 billion USD.

Algeria received between two to four MiG-29UBT in December 2006, and by April 2007 MiG Corporation had transferred 15 MiG-29SMT/UBT. However, in April 2007 the Algerian military stopped making payments on the contract and made several claims regarding the quality of the transferred aircraft. Because the acceptance certificates had already been signed, the claims could not be formulated in a routine juridical manner. Moreover, the Algerian party soon began to insist on the removal of the fighters on the basis of “verbal agreements” without actually annulling the contract. Over the course of the summer, MiG Corporation made efforts to address the Algerian concerns so as to continue the implementation of the contract. However, every offer made by MiG, up to and including the replacement of the delivered fighters with different MiG-29, was refused, and Algeria continued to insist on the return of the fighters. All this time, the Algerian People Army was making intensive use of the fighters, which were deployed to the Laguat airbase 450 km south of Algiers. By some accounts, the fighters were flown between 80 to 100 hours.

By the end of 2007, the Federal Agency for Military-Technical Cooperation, Rosoboroneksport and MiG Corporation came to the conclusion that the best solution to the crisis was to agree to take back the fighters and attempt to replace the MiG-29SMT contract with other agreements (perhaps even for non-aviation deliveries). In February 2008 during the visit of Algerian President Abdeliaziz Buteflik to Russia, an agreement of sorts was reached to return the MiGs to Russia, although the legal status of this agreement is unclear. On February 25 a brigade from MiG Corporation flew to Algeria to disassemble the aircraft. It seems that all of the fighters are now in Russia.



Analysis

Neither Russia nor Algeria has commented on the situation, and so our description of the causes of the collapse of the deal remains speculative. Nonetheless, in our view the crisis has many dimensions, and its multiple causes can be grouped into three categories: (i) technical, (ii) relating to domestic Algerian politics, and (iii) external influence.

First, it seems that the serviceability status of the fighters was indeed less than optimal. Of course, they were not “previously used goods” as some media have speculated, but MiG Corporation did acknowledge that the fighter hulls were built back in 1996. This does not technically violate the terms of the agreement to supply fighters in “current production at the final stage of the technological cycle.” However, it seems that the conditions under which these hulls were stored were such that the Algerian claims have some basis. It is also possible that the problem was not limited to the airframe, but extended to affect onboard equipment assemblies.

It is worth noting that the Algerian military proved itself in the 1990s to be a demanding and proud customer. For example, they once refused to accept overhauled patrol ships from the Kronstadt shipyard for much the same reasons. Algeria also repudiated contracts for deliveries of arms and military equipment from China. So it is likely that MiG Corporation’s efforts to remedy the situation came too late, insofar as the political decision to stop work on the contract had already been taken. Nevertheless, there are signs that technical issues were not the only, or even the main cause of the crisis. The Algerian military surely understood when it signed the agreement that the equipment it was purchasing was not “new” but “current” production. Given the bargain price at which the fighters were sold (just over 20 million USD per vehicle), together with the trade-in provisions, the Algerians should not have had the highest of expectations. Incidentally, the old MiG-23 that Algeria began to send to Russia were in much worse condition than specified in the trade-in contract.

Moreover, in the summer of 2006, that is, before the first MiG-29UBT were delivered, the Algerian Air Force began to scout the market for 30 new series III RD-33 engines, and 15 KSA-15 boxes of aircraft accessories, for the MiG-29 that were to be delivered to Russia in just a few months under the trade-in agreement. MiG Corporation greeted this news with disbelief at first, and then growing anxiety, since it was a clear sign that the Algerians did not intend to fulfill the terms of the contract as agreed.

Second, the MiG-29 deal may have fallen hostage to internecine conflict among the Algerian elite. During his second term in office, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika moved to reduce the influence of the “generals” who have in practice ruled the country since the suspension in 1992 of elections won by the Islamic Salvation Front. Mohammed “Tufik” Medienne, head of the Algerian Secret Services (DNR), is the unofficial leader of this group, and he is thought to have used the real or perceived faults of the MiG to intrigue against the People’s National Army’s chief of staff Ahmed Gaid Salah, an ally of the President. As an ethnic Kabyle, Medienne used his clan connections with leading Kabyle figures in the Algerian Air Force, including the commander in chief, the fighter aviation commander and other highly placed officers, to precipitate the annulment of the contract.

Finally, the influence of external actors on the Algerian leadership cannot be discounted. The USA and France were clearly worried by the sudden acceleration of Russian-Algerian cooperation on military-technical and energy matters. France and the US are the biggest markets for Algeria’s gas – the country’s main export. Moreover, according to members of the Algerian opposition, most of the military and security service leaders have business interests in France, the US and South Africa. So the Algerian leadership is clearly sensitive to the influence of Western countries.



Consequences

It is too early to make a conclusive assessment of the consequences of this crisis. For now, it seems that the refusal to accept the MiG-29SMT has been contained and has not tainted the rest of the package of agreements. According to the assessment of ARMS-TASS, Algeria was the fourth top importer of Russian arms in 2007, accounting for about 10% of Russian defense exports. The contract for the delivery of T-90S tanks is ongoing, and the transfer of Su-30MKI(A) fighters has begun. Moreover, Algeria has continued to place new orders with Russia; for example, for the delivery of submarines. That said, before we can assert that Russian-Algerian military-technical relations are back on track, we will have to wait until the deliveries of Su-30MKI(A) and S-300PMU-2 SAM are completed, that is, contracts under the control of the Algerian Air Force.

absent
25/10/2008, 19h26
depuis le temps, l'algerie a commandée 16 su-30 suplementaires et les yak-130 vont passer de 16 à 24.

absent
25/10/2008, 19h47
le guide libyen va bientôt aller en russie acheter de nouveaux equiements, voici ce qu'on annonce, mais avec la crise economique rien n'est plus sûr :


Libya was interested in purchases from Russia advanced anti-aircraft missile systems S-300PMU2 "Favorite" (it was a few Division) and nearly two dozen ZRS "Tor-M1 as well as MANPADS" Buk-M1-2. Moreover, Tripoli would like to purchase two squadrons of fighter aircraft - one MiG-29SMT and Su-30MK, six training and combat aircraft Yak-130, several dozen Mi-17 helicopters, Mi-35 and Ka-52, about 50 tanks T - 90S, diesel-electric submarine of Project 636, rocket salvo fire systems "Grad", other weapons.

In addition, a number of contracts for the modernization of military equipment delivered to Libya in Soviet times. To date, the Libyan army almost 90% equipped with Soviet-made military equipment. Total for the period from 1981 to 1985, the Soviet Union supplied to Libya military products amounting to $ 4.6 billion alone, combat aircraft were delivered to Libya about 350, including 130 fighter aircraft MiG-23, 70 - MiG-21, six front-line Su-24 bombers and six long-distance bombers Tu-22. At arming the Libyan army is about four thousand Soviet tanks, a large number of anti-aircraft missile systems, naval equipment, other weapons.

Alryib3
25/10/2008, 21h28
Comment font ils pour livrer les Mig? Ils les pilotent jusqu'à chez le client ou bien ils les envoient en piéces détachées?

P.S. C'est une question sérieuse.

mendz
25/10/2008, 21h41
Comment font ils pour livrer les Mig? Ils les pilotent jusqu'à chez le client ou bien ils les envoient en piéces détachées?


Ils les livrent en kit à monter sur place chez le client.

Mais le client peut les monter tout seul s'il en a les capacités comme le fait l'Algérie surtout pour les MIG 29.

Alryib3
25/10/2008, 21h56
Merci pour l'info. ;)

langar
26/10/2008, 04h14
Comment font ils pour livrer les Mig? Ils les pilotent jusqu'à chez le client ou bien ils les envoient en piéces détachées?

slt la livraison se fait generalement par antonov avion cargo russe

chelifien75
26/10/2008, 05h24
Cette histoire de falsification est pourtant claire. :mrgreen:

Les russes en général et les responsables de mig en particulier avaient pris l'habitude de fourguer de la camelotte aux acheteurs arabes.Ceux-ci étant les plus faciles à soudoyer avec des commissions, de la vodka et des filles blondes.Tous les spécialistes ou personnes qui suivent les achats d'armes le savent.
Cela est arrivé aux libyens, aux yemenites, aux égyptiens, aux syriens et bien sûr aux algériens.
Ces "défauts" ne concernaient pas seulement les avions mais aussi les autres armes surtout les chars. :rolleyes:

Les russes, malins et roublards, ne savaient pas qu'en algérie les "négociateurs et acheteurs" ont changé.Ce n'est plus lamari and co qui sont aux commandes.
En effet lamari a été écarté de l'équipe d'acheteurs (ce qui est une bonne chose) et cela a permis aux jeunes cadres de notre armée (les vrais pas les caporaux de l'armée coloniale) de prospecter, essayer, vérifier pour commander.Ce qui n'était pas du goût des russes habitués à plier rapidement ces "négociations".
Ces mêmes russes ont éssayé de faire les malins en trafiquant les mig29 avec du vieux matériel electronique.Mal leur en a pris.Un jeune officier algérien a découvert le pôt aux rose car il avait eu vent de rumeurs des ingénieurs de bielo-russie comme quoi les mig ne sont pas aussi neufs que les responsables de mig le claironnaient.
Ayant eu confirmation de cette ticherie, pour une fois les responsables algériens et à leur tête Boutef, ont déidé de réagir et surtout d'agir.Enfin.

Les russes démasqués crient à la manipulation politique mais finissent par reconnaitre leur trahison d'un sérieux et fidèle client. :mad:

citoyen
26/10/2008, 15h16
Une affaire trouble, russes et algériens cachent quelques choses, ce foisonnement d'articles cache bien des choses bien plus graves. Il s'agit certainement d'une magouille qui a mal tourné.

Je vois mal les russes fermer leur gueule aussi facilement et passer l'éponge comme si les algériens ne leur ont pas cassé le fleuron de leur industrie aéronautique !

Poutine a envhai un pays entier pour sauvegarder l'honneur russe, avec bouteflika, il noit le poisson et charge ses relais médiatiques pour brouiller les pistes. Les algériens font de même a travers certains relais...donc la magouille est ailleurs.

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