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Dans l'article ci dessous, "the Economist Intelligence Unit" estime que la décision du gouvernement de suspendre la privatisation du Crédit populaire d'Algérie est mauvaise. En agissant ainsi, les investisseurs vont douter de la crédibilité du gouvernement à propos des réformes qu'il prétend mener, et le secteur financier algérien va encore rester l'un des plus moribonds de la région. Il estime que le ministère des finances aurait mieux fait de reporter la date limite de dépôt des offres.
Why Algeria has scrapped its first bank privatisation
The Algerian government has shelved plans for its first bank privatisation on the eve of the deadline for the submission of bids. According to Fatiha Mentouri, the minister in charge of financial sector reform, the ructions in the global banking market were to blame—a plausible explanation, as far it goes. However, the decision has disturbing echoes of last year's backtracking on a law that had originally aimed to open up the oil and gas sector to more competition, and will strengthen suspicions that economic reform in Algeria faces insurmountable obstacles from vested interest profiting from the status quo. Given the unfortunate experience of Algeria's efforts to promote a home-grown private banking sector—which culminated in the Khalifa bank scandal, in which more than US$1.5bn of public funds were lost—selling one of the six state-owned banks has been recognised as an essential step in developing the stunted financial services industry and thereby laying the basis for stimulating growth in the non-hydrocarbons economy.
The government started the process of selling a majority stake in Crédit populaire d'Algérie (CPA) in 2005 with the selection of Rothschild of France to advise on the transaction. The following year six banks were pre-qualified, four of them French—Crédit Agricole, BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Natexis Banque Populaire—in addition to Citibank of the US and Spain's Banco Santander. Most of these banks are familiar with the Algerian market, either through having opening a branch in the country or through involvement in trade and project finance. CPA has an estimated 12% share of the Algerian market, with total assets of US$6.1bn, according to the most recent published accounts, for 2005.
The pace quickened at the start of 2007, when the government set up data rooms to allow the prospective bidders to conduct due diligence. The terms of reference for the deal were agreed at the end of the summer, and November 26th was set as the date for the submission of technical and financial bids. News of the decision to suspend the deal leaked out two days before the deadline, and Ms Mentouri arranged a press conference on the 26th to explain the move. She said that the number of likely bidders had shrunk to three, as Santander had decided to focus on its effort to acquire ABN Amro, Citibank had been obliged to withdraw owing to the reverberations of the subprime crisis in the US, and Crédit Agricole had requested a bid extension. With just three bidders in the frame, Ms Mentouri said that there was a risk that the reduced competition would drive down the price. She said that the process could be restarted at a later date, depending on the course of the current international banking crisis, and she maintained that the government's programme of financial sector reform was "irreversible".
Not just price
Nevertheless, the manner of the CPA decision raises a number of questions. The government could have simply postponed the deadline for a few months, which would, presumably, have given some of the three bidders that had withdrawn the opportunity to reconsider. It would also have been possible for the government to have made a decision to retender after having received the bids, if the bids were judged to have come in below the target price. At a more profound level, the CPA privatisation was less about generating funds for the government through the sale of a strategic asset—Algeria has virtually no external debt and its foreign exchange reserves are close to US$100bn—than about revamping the banking sector through bringing in a top-notch international institution to modernise the management and operating systems of a flagship bank. The price of the deal would have had an impact in terms of domestic political acceptance, but the main thrust of the privatisation process is to transform one of the most backward banking sectors in the region.
Previous
Ms Mentouri's explanation would have been more convincing had it not been for the precedent of the hydrocarbons law revisions. That law was amended in 2006, one year after it had been finally passed, restoring automatic majority control of oil and gas projects to Sonatrach, the national oil company. At the same time the government introduced a retroactive windfall profit tax on the share of oil produced by foreign partners when the crude price exceeded US$30/barrel. Following the changes to the hydrocarbons law, investment in the upstream oil and gas sector has slowed. The government has acknowledged that it is no longer interested in increasing crude oil production, but it is still ostensibly committed to increasing natural gas production and exports. Concerns are starting to be expressed as to whether Algeria will have sufficient gas available for two new gas pipelines that are scheduled to start deliveries to Spain in 2009 and to Italy in 2012.
The revisions to the hydrocarbons law did not come as a complete surprise, however, as the rise in the oil price means that Sonatrach is not as dependent as it was in the past on foreign capital for ongoing projects. The situation in the banking sector is different, as the development of the non-hydrocarbons economy has been held back by the moribund state of the Algerian financial services industry. Turning away foreign banks that have invested considerable effort in preparing bids for a landmark privatisation deal will not help.
source : The Economist
Why Algeria has scrapped its first bank privatisation
The Algerian government has shelved plans for its first bank privatisation on the eve of the deadline for the submission of bids. According to Fatiha Mentouri, the minister in charge of financial sector reform, the ructions in the global banking market were to blame—a plausible explanation, as far it goes. However, the decision has disturbing echoes of last year's backtracking on a law that had originally aimed to open up the oil and gas sector to more competition, and will strengthen suspicions that economic reform in Algeria faces insurmountable obstacles from vested interest profiting from the status quo. Given the unfortunate experience of Algeria's efforts to promote a home-grown private banking sector—which culminated in the Khalifa bank scandal, in which more than US$1.5bn of public funds were lost—selling one of the six state-owned banks has been recognised as an essential step in developing the stunted financial services industry and thereby laying the basis for stimulating growth in the non-hydrocarbons economy.
The government started the process of selling a majority stake in Crédit populaire d'Algérie (CPA) in 2005 with the selection of Rothschild of France to advise on the transaction. The following year six banks were pre-qualified, four of them French—Crédit Agricole, BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Natexis Banque Populaire—in addition to Citibank of the US and Spain's Banco Santander. Most of these banks are familiar with the Algerian market, either through having opening a branch in the country or through involvement in trade and project finance. CPA has an estimated 12% share of the Algerian market, with total assets of US$6.1bn, according to the most recent published accounts, for 2005.
The pace quickened at the start of 2007, when the government set up data rooms to allow the prospective bidders to conduct due diligence. The terms of reference for the deal were agreed at the end of the summer, and November 26th was set as the date for the submission of technical and financial bids. News of the decision to suspend the deal leaked out two days before the deadline, and Ms Mentouri arranged a press conference on the 26th to explain the move. She said that the number of likely bidders had shrunk to three, as Santander had decided to focus on its effort to acquire ABN Amro, Citibank had been obliged to withdraw owing to the reverberations of the subprime crisis in the US, and Crédit Agricole had requested a bid extension. With just three bidders in the frame, Ms Mentouri said that there was a risk that the reduced competition would drive down the price. She said that the process could be restarted at a later date, depending on the course of the current international banking crisis, and she maintained that the government's programme of financial sector reform was "irreversible".
Not just price
Nevertheless, the manner of the CPA decision raises a number of questions. The government could have simply postponed the deadline for a few months, which would, presumably, have given some of the three bidders that had withdrawn the opportunity to reconsider. It would also have been possible for the government to have made a decision to retender after having received the bids, if the bids were judged to have come in below the target price. At a more profound level, the CPA privatisation was less about generating funds for the government through the sale of a strategic asset—Algeria has virtually no external debt and its foreign exchange reserves are close to US$100bn—than about revamping the banking sector through bringing in a top-notch international institution to modernise the management and operating systems of a flagship bank. The price of the deal would have had an impact in terms of domestic political acceptance, but the main thrust of the privatisation process is to transform one of the most backward banking sectors in the region.
Previous
Ms Mentouri's explanation would have been more convincing had it not been for the precedent of the hydrocarbons law revisions. That law was amended in 2006, one year after it had been finally passed, restoring automatic majority control of oil and gas projects to Sonatrach, the national oil company. At the same time the government introduced a retroactive windfall profit tax on the share of oil produced by foreign partners when the crude price exceeded US$30/barrel. Following the changes to the hydrocarbons law, investment in the upstream oil and gas sector has slowed. The government has acknowledged that it is no longer interested in increasing crude oil production, but it is still ostensibly committed to increasing natural gas production and exports. Concerns are starting to be expressed as to whether Algeria will have sufficient gas available for two new gas pipelines that are scheduled to start deliveries to Spain in 2009 and to Italy in 2012.
The revisions to the hydrocarbons law did not come as a complete surprise, however, as the rise in the oil price means that Sonatrach is not as dependent as it was in the past on foreign capital for ongoing projects. The situation in the banking sector is different, as the development of the non-hydrocarbons economy has been held back by the moribund state of the Algerian financial services industry. Turning away foreign banks that have invested considerable effort in preparing bids for a landmark privatisation deal will not help.
source : The Economist
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