Annonce

**Harrachi78** · 25 juin 2021, 09h53

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The late Abbasid pattern (945-1050)

The decline and fall of the Abbasid caliphate in the first half of the 10th century led to the emergence of a new political order.

The most fundamental change was the collapse of the resource base and fiscal system that had sustained the caliphate. [...] The once rich landscapes of the alluvial plain of southern Iraq were ruined and impoverished by a mixture of malad ministration, military campaigning and lack of investment. Such meagre revenues as they continued to yield had been appropriated by the military nominally serving the government in Baghdad or by independent adventurers, and no longer filled the coffers of the state.

This economic decline profoundly affected the political geography of the Islamic world. Even under the Umayyads, whose courts were predominantly to the west in Syria, Iraq had been the resource base of the caliphate, and this status had been reinforced under the early Abbasids by investment in agricul tural infrastructure. By the mid 10th century, however, Iraq was probably no more productive than many other areas. This fiscal realignment was the prelude to a political shift that resulted in the centrifugal dispersal of power ; polities based in Fars, Khurasan or Egypt could be just as wealthy and powerful as those based in the old heartland. With the collapse of the centre, power passed to new regimes in the provinces.

Social and religious changes were also in progress. In the 1st century and a half of Islam the caliphate was inhabited largely by non Muslims ruled over by an elite class of Muslims, most of whom were of Arab descent. By the 3th and 4th centuries, however, this had changed. The central administration of the Middle Abbasid caliphate was increasingly dominated by men of non Arab, usually Turkish or eastern Iranian origin. One effect of this was to alienate the Bedouin tribes of the Arabian and Syrian deserts from the formal government, as can be seen from the increasing level of nomad attacks on the hajj in the late 9th and early 10th centuries. At the same time, increasing conversion to Islam in provinces and outlying regions meant that these areas produced native Muslim elites,
whether landowners in Fars or the chiefs of transhumant Kurdish tribes. They were all Muslims, but saw no need to show any deference or obedience to the authorities in Baghdad and Iraq. It is a striking fact that, with one exception, none of the dynasts and warlords who took power in the lands that the Abbasids had ruled made any attempt to reject Islam or establish Christian or Zoroastrian states.

The lands that had once formed the domains of the Abbasid caliphate became a commonwealth in the sense that they were linked by many ties : by the shared elite religion, Islam ; the use of Arabic as the language of administration and high culture ; and by patterns of trade and pilgrimage which brought together people from all over the area. Baghdad itself remained a centre of scholarship that attracted seekers of knowledge from all parts of the Muslim world. But these links no longer provided the basis for political unity. In place of the caliphate, numerous different ruling polities emerged, each striving to maintain itself in its chosen area.

[...] The post Abbasid history of the central Islamic lands is usually presented in dynastic terms (e.g. Buyids, Ghaznavids ... etc.), the names of the dynasties often being distinct from those of the tribes that supported them : thus the Banū Mazyad (or Mazyadids) were chiefs of the Asad tribe, the Mirdasids of the Kilāb ... etc., the name of the ruling dynasty usually being derived from that of the father or grandfather of the fist important ruler. This may seem somewhat arbitrary and show cavalier disregard for regional identities and economic realities ; it can certainly result in a bewildering multitude of unmemorable names. It does, however, reflect the terminology of the sources on which we depend and the reality of political power, and these conventional dynastic divisions are probably the most satisfactory way of presenting these developments.

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**Harrachi78** · 25 juin 2021, 10h16

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Typology of successor regimes

The Abbasid caliphate did not disappear. The three caliphs who succeeded the unfortunate al-Muttaqī (al-Mustakfī 944-946, al-Muttī3 946-974 and al-Tā'i3 974-991), were effectively powerless puppets confined to their palace in Baghdad, without any possibility of independent action. All three were deposed [...]. However powerless and impoverished they were in reality, their continued existence did, however, provide a constitutional façade for the different dynasts who did control the Muslim world and their survival meant that the Abbasids could take on a new and important role as leaders of the Sunnī community from the time of al-Qādir (991-1031).

The regimes that took over effective political power from the Abbasid caliphs can be divided, very simply, according to the type of fiscal and military structure on which they based their power : in one group were the polities were based on the employment of the ghulām, and in the second those based on the support of fellow tribesmen.

The term ghulām (pl. ghilmān), originally meaning "young man", is used in Arabic sources of this period to describe professional soldiers, usually but not always of Turkish origin. From the 11th century such soldiers would come to be known in Arabic speaking countries as mamluks. Legally, the ghilmān were slaves, but in practice this made little difference to their ability to further their own financial and political interests and, unlike true slaves, they were paid for their work. During the 9th century the ghilmān had emerged as the undisputed elite soldiers of their time, fighting as cavalry and often as mounted archers. They were efficient, usually loyal and always very expensive. Many of the post-Abbasid regimes attempted to continue the old system and employ ghilmān, with their salaries being paid out of the receipts of taxation. With the exception of the Ghaznavids, who acquired additional resources out of the proceeds of jihad in India, regional regimes such as the Buyids mostly encountered major financial problems, and their precious ghilmān went looking elsewhere for paid employment or mutinied to try to extort their pay.

On the other hand, regional dynasts who based their power on the services of their fellow tribesmen were not under this constant financial pressure, since their followers were interested in access to good pastures and occasional booty rather than regular cash salaries. But tribal supporters brought other sorts of problems. They were often difficult to discipline, and unwilling to accept commands from a chief whom they regarded as no more than primus inter pares. Among these states were the Uqaylids of Mosul, whose support was based on Arab Bedouin ; another was the Marwanids of Mayyafariqīn, and their transhumant Kurds. In ghulām based states the traditions of Abbasid bureaucracy were continued, with greater or lesser success: revenues still had to be collected and salaries paid. [...] Tribal polities needed no such infrastructure : their rulers were often on the move and their viziers served not as heads of a complex bureaucratic structure, but rather as intermediaries with local peoples and to compose such diplomatic correspondence as was required.
Almost without exception the rulers of these polities looked to Abbasid structures to provide a form of legitimisation. They took titles that claimed them to be supporters of the dawla that is, the Abbasid dynasty, so we find Imād a-Dawla (‘support of the dawla’), Rukn a-Dawla (‘pillar of the dawla’) and so on. In fact, this allegiance rarely impinged on their independence, nor did it provide any support against their enemies ; but it did allow some dynasts, most notably the Ghaznavids, to claim a legitimacy within the Muslim commonwealth which these newly converted Turkish ex-slaves would other wise have lacked.

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**Harrachi78** · 25 juin 2021, 12h01

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Sunnism and Shīism

The period from 945 to 1050, which we can call that of the Muslim commonwealth, was in some ways a period of dissolution and disintegration, and the elaborate and powerful state structures so admired by many historians collapsed. But at the same time it was like 15th century Italy, in that great political diversity went along with immense cultural achievement. It was also a time when many provincial centres acquired their own Muslim identity for the first time.

It was also a period when religious divisions within the Islamic community hardened. Perhaps the most important and long lasting development within the Islamic umma during this period was the formalisation of the divisions between Sunnī and Shiī branches in the Muslim world. It would be fair to say that, in 900, many Muslims did not consider themselves either Shiī or Sunnī. It is true that many Muslims venerated the house of Alī, and that some fervently believed that only with the accession to power of a member of that house could a truly just Muslim society be established. There was no body of Shiī ritual, however, which distinguished its adherents from other Muslims, and no distinctively Shiī festivals.

It was in Baghdad during the period of Buyid rule (945-1055) that ‘Twelver’ Shiīsme developed more distinctive religious practices and a clearer sense of communal identity. The last of the widely acknowledged imams, al-Hasan al-Askarī, died in Samarra in 874, leaving no generally accepted heir. During the course of the 10th century, however, it came to be believed among the Shiī that he had left a son who had remained hidden and never died, but would come again to establish the rule of true Islam. Meanwhile, he had left representatives in the world to guide the faithful in his absence. Acceptance of the imam remained, however, fundamental to true belief, since he was the hujja, the proof of God, without whom there could be no Islam. This theory of the imamate was developed in Baghdad by such scholars as al-Kulaynī (d. 940) and above all al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 1022), who produced the view of the imamate generally held by Twelvers down to the present day.

[...] This newly emerging Shiīsm was not formally the state religion of the Buyids (in the sense that Ismā3īli Shiīsm was in the Fatatmid caliphate). Remote Daylam, the original homeland of the dynasty, was an area in which members of the Alid family had sought refuge and made converts, and the Buyids were, in some sense, Shiīa. They made no attempt, however, to replace the Abbasid caliphs with rulers from the house of Alī. There were good practical reasons for this. Such a move would have alienated many in Iraq and western Iran who were otherwise prepared to accept Buyid rule in exchange for a measure of peace and security. It would also have meant finding an imam from the house of Alī, and such an imam might well have wanted to take real power in his own name. However, Shīi scholars were given some support by figures at the Buyid court, such as the vizier, Sābur b. Ardāshīr, who established a major Shiīte library in 991. The scholars were also patronised by rich local families of Alid descent who were in many cases close to the Buyid court, such as the sharīfs al-Radiyy (d. 1015) and al-Murtadā (d. 1044). While some Buyid rulers, notably Adud al-Dawla (d. 982), seem to have discouraged speculation that might divide the Muslim community, others at least tolerated it and allowed their courtiers to provide patronage for the needy intellectuals involved.

New elements distinguished the Shiī from other sects, specially its distinctive and exclusive religious observances. These included the public denigration of the first two caliphs (Abu-Bakr and Umar), who were held to have usurped the rights of Alī, and the development of certain particularly Shiīte public festivals. The most important of these festivals was the mourning for al-Husayn on 10 Muharram and the celebration of Ghadīr Khumm on 18 Dhu l-Hijja, in commemoration of the event when the Prophet was said to have acknowledged Alī as his successor during the Farewell Pilgrimage in 632.There also took place the development of the tombs of members of the Alid family as centres of pilgrimage. These three elements characterise the development of the mature Shiīsm of the 10th century as distinct from the reverence for Alī or support of Alid pretenders to the caliphate which had been common in previous centuries. This Shiīsm was basically quietist in that its adherents did not demand the immediate installation of an Alid as caliph, nor did they feel that they had to take up arms to achieve this. The three distinguishing features of the new Shiīsm described above were all essentially public acts,
and at least two were exclusive ; while any Muslim could accept the veneration of the tomb of Alī, if not those of all his descendants, no one could accept the celebration of Ghadīr Khumm or the cursing of the first two caliphs without cutting himself off from a large number of other Muslims. Sectarian tension between supporters and opponents of the house of Alī had been increasing in Baghdad before the coming of the Buyids, but the policies of Mu3izz a-Dawla (d. 967) and Bakhtiyār (d. 978) escalated the situation by taking deliberately provocative positions on the three elements outlined above.

From the time of their arrival in Baghdad, the Daylamites became associated with the Shīi point of view, and allowed and encouraged the development of a Shiī party in the capital, partly to secure the support of at least one constituency among the Baghdad populace. In 962, Mu3izz a-Dawla provoked public anger by having curses of the first two caliphs painted on walls in Baghdad. In the end his astute vizier, al-Muhallabī, persuaded him that only the first Umayyad caliph, Mu3āwiya, who had few admirers in Iraq, should be condemned. In 964, Mu3izz a-Dawla encouraged the public celebration of the two important Shiī festivals, to the intense annoyance of many in Baghdad. In the same period the Shiī shrines of Iraq and Iran were increasingly revered, and they came to replace Mecca and Medina, increasingly difficult to reach because of the lawless conditions in the Arabian Peninsula, as the goal of pilgrimage for many Shiī. In 953, an officer from Basra requested to be buried beside al-Husayn at Karbala, and the practice of Shiīte burial ad sanctos soon grew in popularity. [...] Under Buyid patronage most of the famous Shiī shrines were embellished, not only the tombs of Alī and al-Husayn, but also that of Fātima in Qumm and of Alī al-Ridā near Tūs.

A further step in the differentiation of sects within Islam came with the establishment of the Fatimid caliphate in Egypt in 969. As long as the Fatimids, with their claims to be imams directly descended from Alī and Isma3īl, were confined to the Maghrib, they did not constitute a serious threat and could be dismissed as provincial dissidents. When they took over Egypt,
began to move into southern Palestine and to send missionaries throughout the Middle-East, it became essential for the Shiīte of Baghdad to distinguish themselves from these newcomers. The Fatimids claimed to be caliphs of the entire Islamic world, so it was important for the Buyids too that the Shiīte ideology they espoused did not accept Fatimid claims to the imamate. [...]

It was also at this time that the Turks became identfied with the anti-Shiī party. There is no evidence that the Turks of Samarra in the 9th century had shown any hostility at all to the house of Alī, and many of them had supported the Mu3tazilite movement. From Bakhtiyar’s reign, however,.they became associated with the Sunnī cause, a development which became firmly established in the next century when Turkish rulers such as Mahmūd of Ghazna and the Saljūqs emphasised their role as champions of Sunnism. The identication of Turkish rulers with Sunnism was to persist throughout the Saljuq and Ottoman periods, outside Safavid Iran.

Throughout the second half of the Buyid period, processions on sectarian feast days and the writing of infammatory slogans, particularly the cursing of the Companions of the Prophet and the first three caliphs, were to provide fash points for continuing violence. Despite the efforts of determined rulers of Baghdad such as Adud a-Dawla to put an end to the growth of sectarian tension, the divide between the Shiītes and their opponents continued to harden. [...]

In the early 11th century, a new element was added to the deep ening divisions between the sects when the Abbasid caliphs assumed the role of champion of the Sunnī community. As Buyid power in Baghdad decayed, so the Abbasids began to explore ways of increasing their power and status. The Abbasid caliphs became firmly attached to the Sunnī cause, and they were encouraged in this by the rising power of Mahmūd of Ghazna, who linked himself firmly to the Sunnī, anti Buyid position.

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**Harrachi78** · 25 juin 2021, 12h16

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The last decades of Buyid rule in Baghdad, despite the political chaos, witnessed a religious development which was to affect the whole subsequent history of Islam : the so called Sunnī revival. This was not, in fact, so much of a revival as the formulation and definition of Sunnism in response to the contemporary emergence of Imamī (Twelver) Shiīsm. The new Sunnism was based on the ideas of the muhaddithūn (Traditionists), first developed in the 9th centurie. They had held that the traditions of the Prophet (sunna) were the only true foundation of Islamic law and religious practice, and
that no imām, whether descended from Alī or not, should presume to interfere. In Baghdad this division was intensified by political strife: while Shiīsm was intermittently patronised by the Buyids and their representatives in Baghdad, the lead in the elaboration of Sunnism was taken by the Abbasid caliph.

The caliph al-Qādir (991-1031) worked to codify a Sunnī doctrinal and ritual position to counter that of the Shiīa and to strengthen his position against the absent Buyid ruler of Baghdad, Bahā a-Dawla. His first opportunity came in 1003 when the Buyide was rash enough to propose a leading member of the family of Alī, Abū-Ahmad al-Musawī, as chief qādī in Baghdad. For the first time the Abbasid caliph put himself at the head of the popular protest and, successfully, refused to accept the nomination. [...] He did, however, find common ground with the Buyids in his opposition to the claims of the Fatimids, and so established himself as spokesman for both Sunnī and Twelver Shiī.

The death of Bahā a-Dawla allowed him more scope. In 1018 he took a major step, issuing a decree which condemned Mu3tazilism and Shiīsm and asserted that the Companions of the Prophet and all the first four caliphs should be venerated by ‘true’ Muslims. These doctrines were repeated and elaborated in 1029 when the doctrine of the createdness of the Quran was explicitly condemned.

This creed, the so called al-Risāla al-Qādiriyya, marks a fundamental development for two reasons. The first was because Sunnism was defined explicitly and positively. Hitherto, the supporters of the sunna had largely been defined by their opposition to the claims of the Twelver Shiī ;
now there was a body of positive belief which had to be accepted by anyone claiming to be a Sunnī. Like the Twelver doctrines developed during the previous century, it was exclusive; the acceptance of the veneration of the first four caliphs meant rejecting the claims of the Twelvers that Alī had been unjustly deprived of the caliphate. It was no longer possible to be simply a Muslim: one was either Sunnī or Shiī.

The second important development was that the Abbasid caliph had emerged as spokesman for the Sunnī. The early Abbasid caliphs were not, in the classical sense, Sunnī ; an important part of the Abbasid claim to the caliphate was dependent on a recognition that the family of the Prophet, of which they could claim to be a branch, had a unique claim to leadership. They usually opposed the claims of the Alids to political power, but that did not make them Sunnī. [...] By his action al-Qādir had become the champion of the Sunnī and Traditionists against the claims of Twelver Shiī and Fatimids alike. He had also created a new and lasting role for the Abbasid caliphate. As Ja3far al-Sādiq had shown in the 8th century, it was possible to be an imām from the house of Alī without taking an active role in politics or making claims to the caliphate, so al-Qādir showed that there was a religious role for the Abbasid caliphs, a role which they could fulfil despite the fact that their temporal power was non existent.

Al-Qādir was able to take this position because he had more political independence. To begin with, the Buyid emirate of Baghdad had become so weak that it could not afford to take action against the caliph. He could also count on a large body of support in Baghdad itself ; the people might not fight to restore the political power of the Abbasid caliph, but many of them would support the Sunnī cause against the pretensions of the Shiī. In addition he received powerful moral support from Mahmud of Ghazna. He was a fierce opponent of the Buyids on a political level, but he also gave a religious dimension to the conflict by accusing them of being heretics and claiming that he was the champion of Sunnī Islam. He established himself as protector of the hajj, a role traditionally played by the caliphs as leaders of the Muslim community. This moral support from the East enabled al-Qādir to distance himself from the Buyids. But this did not lead to direct political power. By the time of his death, al-Qādir had established his moral and religious authority, but the Abbasid caliph had no troops to command and no land to call his own beyond the gates of his palace.

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**wahrani** · 26 juin 2021, 22h33

very good retrospective of the evolution of the Muslim world and the impacts of Islamic sciences ( العلم الاسلامي ).

**Harrachi78** · 27 juin 2021, 12h08

Envoyé par wahrani Voir le message

... and the impacts of Islamic sciences ( العلم الاسلامي ).

C'est quel passage ça ?!

**hmida** · 27 juin 2021, 16h49

L'islam vrai va du prophète saws jusqu'à l'apparition de la "deuxième révélation" que sont les compilations de hadith.
Soit environ deux siècles je pense.

**Invité** · 01 juillet 2021, 21h25

L'islam vrai était maintenu par les khalifes divins qui sont les 12 IMAMS, les véritables successeurs du Prophètes pslf
Et après il y'a eu occultation du 12ème Imam , le véritable islam reviendra à la fin des temps (de l'injustice)
Et il y'aura l'époque de justice et équité

Quant à l'islam omeyyade et abbasside c'était des trucs mondains, étatiques, faux, une usurpation quoi
Et ils avaient des savants des palais qui ont fabriqué des hadith faux, une histoire fausse
Les gouverneurs omeyyades et abbassides tyrans, fornicateurs et alcooliques étaient présentés comme pieux

**Elghifari** · 04 juillet 2021, 01h04

Une position courageuse de feu Nawal Saadaoui :

"La Première Dame d'Egypte, le Dr Nawal El Saadawi. Le Hajj est un rituel, je ne crois pas aux rituels"

Elle n'est pas hypocrite et dit ce qu'elle pense.

Pour moi, elle est le "Karl Marx" de l'Égypte et du monde arabe et islamique !!!

**Elghifari** · 04 juillet 2021, 01h10

Le monde musulman doit faire sa révolution culturelle c'est à dire : assainir son patrimoine religieux et revenir au Coran.
Les hadith et les fatwa ont éclipsé le Coran qui doit être l'âme de l'islam.
Les interprétations classiques se sont éloignées ou opposées au Coran.

**Elghifari** · 04 juillet 2021, 01h14

Les musulmans doivent faire leur révolution culturelle et revenir au Coran qui est la seule interprétation de l'islam et son âme.

Après la mort du Prophète, l'islam a été transformé en une idéologie des oppresseurs sultans, rois et classes sociales rétrogrades musulmanes.

**delci** · 04 juillet 2021, 10h13

Les musulmans doivent faire leur révolution culturelle et revenir au Coran qui est la seule interprétation de l'islam et son âme.

Pas n'importe quelle lecture. Au vue de la promotion que tu lui fais, une lecture du genre de celle de Nawel Saadaoui est a privilégier.

**delci** · 12 juillet 2021, 10h57

"La Première Dame d'Egypte, le Dr Nawal El Saadawi. Le Hajj est un rituel, je ne crois pas aux rituels"

Elle ne croit ni en Dieu, ni en sa religion, c'est une athée pure et dure qui a en elle une haine viscérale de l'islam et de tout ce qui s'y rapporte.

Annonce

Évolution du Monde musulman (après 945)

Évolution du Monde musulman (après 945)

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