Sans développer sa propre industrie militaire lourde on ne peut pas dire que l’Algérie est en sécurité, ces armes coûtent beaucoup surtout pour couvrir un territoire aussi vaste, l’Algérie doit collaborer avec l'Iran pour développer des missiles hypersoniques capables d'atteindre l'Europe en quelques minutes, imaginant un missile qui part de l'iran pour une cible en Israël prend environs 11 minutes alors on peut estimer le temps nécessaire pour arriver à Paris depuis Alger et qui sera moins de 3 minutes.
Annonce
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Aucune annonce.
La Russie s’apprête à livrer à l’Algérie son premier bombardier tactique Su-34M
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le temps nécessaire pour arriver à Paris depuis Alger et qui sera moins de 3 minutes.
Le missile M51 est un missile mer-sol balistique stratégique (MSBS) français dont la partie haute peut contenir jusqu'à 10 têtes nucléaires ayant chacune une trajectoire indépendante.au n°16 de la rue Grande-Pohulanka, à Wilno, habitait M. Piekielny
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La dissuasion ne veut pas dire attaquer, mais se défendre au cas où comme l'a fait récemment l'Iran en légitime défense. Avec la dissuasion, aucun pays n'a intérêt à agresser un autre.
L'ennemi, le zemmourisme trumpisme est chez soi en Europe. Le fascisme qui avance masqué en Europe veut surtout l'épuration ethnique et rêve de nouvelles années 30. Il passe son temps à créer des fichiers de noms comme le nazisme autrefois.
Les armes russes passent elles entre les mains de satan yahou ? Car en Syrie et au Liban, Poutine avait l'air très complice avec satan yahou.
Qui se souvient du détournement de l'Arctic Sea en 2009 , bateau en direction de l'Algérie ?
"....Selon une version parue dans la presse, le navire aurait transporté des missiles sol-air S-300 achetés au marché noir russe à destination de l'Iran (chargement effectué à Kaliningrad, enclave connue pour être une base de transit pour les cargaisons illégales[19]), et les pirates auraient été engagés pour faire échouer la transaction en faisant intervenir l'armée russe[20]. L'intervention du Mossad est également évoquée, les services secrets israéliens ayant découvert ce trafic de missiles S-300. L'État israélien a en effet signé des accords de coopération en matière de recherche technologique militaire avec la Russie et les deux États se sont accordés pour limiter leurs livraisons d'équipement militaire dans les zones qu'ils jugent sensibles[21]. Le Mossad et le FSB auraient alors été missionnés pour une mise en scène de piraterie afin de stopper ce trafic de missiles qui devait rester secret[22]. L'assassinat le 30 juillet 2009 d'Andrei Barabenko, cadre important du fabricant Almaz-Antey de missiles S-300, serait également en lien avec cette affaire, ainsi que la visite éclair le 18 août en Russie du président israélien Shimon Peres[23].
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_SeaDernière modification par panshir, 17 août 2025, 21h07.
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Je n'en crois pas un mot...
Maintenant je sais pas. Mais à l'époque de l'union soviétique, il y avait une base navale ou étaient stationnés des Sous-marins nucléaires Soviétiques à Annaba, en Algérie. C'était une base secrete.Dernière modification par Issabrahimi, 17 août 2025, 17h10.
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t n'ont pas utilisé leur Topol, Sineva, Bulava.
hmida
Mais ils ont utilisé Oreshnik contre l'Ukraine, capable de transporter plusieurs ogives nucléaires. et ils n'ont avisé les Américains que 20 minutes avant le tir.
Biden avait presque une crise cardiaque.
Le message Russe en langue de Morse était le suivant '' Ce tir n'est pas destiné à l'Amérique''.Dernière modification par Issabrahimi, 17 août 2025, 17h11.
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Maintenant je sais pas. Mais à l'époque de l'union soviétique, il y avait une base navale ou étaient stationnés des Sous-marins nucléaires Soviétiques à Annaba, en Algérie. C'était une base secrete.
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rodmaroc
Ça vient de la CIA ici l'article:
31. Paper Prepared by the Policy Review Committee1
Washington, undated
Introduction
Our reluctance to allow the Moroccan Government to use our military equipment in the Sahara and Mauritania in the course of its conflict with the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas has resulted in growing estrangement in our historically close relations with Morocco. Meanwhile the Algerian-American rapprochement has lost its momentum due to the resurgence of serious political differences and indications the U.S. will not approve further liquefied natural gas (LNG) contracts. In Algeria, the Soviet efforts to secure additional naval facilities on NATO’s southern flank could have some success if there is a sharp deterioration in Algerian-American relations. Morocco and Algeria are engaged in an expensive arms race, and there is the possibility of a direct military confrontation.
As U.S. policy toward the Sahara conflict is central to our present relations with Morocco and Algeria, this paper identifies the core elements of American policy on that dispute and describes two alternative strategies, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. These are aligning ourselves more closely with Morocco and more active U.S. promotion of a peaceful settlement. The paper does not assume that our current policy is inadequate, but it does emphasize the strain which has resulted in relations with Morocco as we pursued our present [Page 59]strategy. It also describes the current impasse with the Moroccans provoked by their use of American arms in the western Sahara and Mauritania and steps underway within the framework of our current policy to overcome this impasse. The paper concludes that regardless of our policy choices it would be desirable to have a high-level U.S. emissary speak with leaders in Rabat and Algiers in the near future.
Morocco Questions U.S. Objectives and Friendship
King Hassan appears to be questioning the value of his close relationship with the U.S. During the previous Administration, Secretary Kissinger expressed to Hassan his “personal view” that Moroccan dominance in northwest Africa would be preferable to that of Algeria;2 and at the United Nations in 1975 the U.S. voted in favor of the pro-Moroccan resolution on the Sahara while abstaining on its pro-Algerian rival. In December 1977 President Carter expressed to the Moroccan Prime Minister his sympathy with Moroccan concern about Soviet intrusions in Africa.3 This sentiment has been echoed by other Administration officials, including one Cabinet member, in meetings with the King. Hassan is aware that the President assured Giscard d’Estaing that the U.S. understood the reasons for French military intervention against the Polisario guerrillas in Mauritania. The President has stated publicly U.S. appreciation for Moroccan military assistance to Zaire during the Shaba incursion.
Against this background, the Moroccans professed to be astonished by the Administration’s statements to Congressional committees that the Administration recognized Moroccan administrative control but not sovereignty over the western Sahara,4 although they are well aware this has been our policy since early 1976 (and the policy of Morocco’s other friends in the West). They are bitterly disappointed by the U.S. refusal to sell them arms to be used in the Sahara, and they contrast our position with that of the Soviets who impose no similar restrictions on weapons they furnish the Algerians. They may refuse to withdraw the F–5 aircraft presently in the Sahara and Mauritania in violation of our assistance agreement or refuse to give formal assurances that U.S. weapons will not be used in these areas, thereby perhaps provoking a U.S. arms embargo (affecting both our $45 million FMS credit program and the more than $100 million in planned Moroccan commercial arms purchases) and a major crisis in bilateral relations.
[Page 60]
The Moroccans are also quite concerned by the Administration’s perceived failure to counter effectively Soviet/Cuban intrusions in Africa. While there is self-serving exaggeration in his characterization of the Polisario’s challenge to Moroccan/Mauritanian control of the Sahara as Soviet inspired or manipulated, the King is genuinely alarmed by the propensity of the Soviets generously to support militarily left wing forces in African disputes.
Belatedly, the King decided he should take his case directly to the President. Having aborted on three days notice a state visit scheduled to begin December 7 (the fifth such “postponement” in seven years), he unsuccessfully sought a meeting with President Carter at a time when the President’s schedule was exceptionally busy.
Impending Discord with Algeria
Perhaps to improve its access to the U.S. energy market, and to American technology and finance for the development of Algeria’s hydrocarbon industry, the Boumediene Government made a number of gestures, e.g., assignment of an Ambassador, intended to normalize relations with the new Carter Administration. Repeated efforts were undertaken to exploit the new Administration’s interest in human rights to win sympathy for the Polisario’s self-determination demands. As relations with France worsened in late 1977 following French military intervention against the Polisario, the Algerians, anxious not to be estranged simultaneously from both Paris and Washington, muted their growing disagreements with the United States on the Middle East.
The Algerians also downplayed their frustration at the Department of Energy’s continuing delay in reaching decisions overdue since December 31, 1977 on two pending major LNG import contracts. Although the Algerians probably perceive a political motive, the delay is due to national energy policy considerations. Major factors in DOE’s review of the two cases are their consistency with the LNG import policy being developed by an Interagency Task Force and the draft energy bill, with respect to security of supply, pricing, environment, and other factors. Public oral arguments have been heard in one case, and probably will be heard in the second. No date has been set for final decisions in these cases.
Algerian pleasure at U.S. refusal to sell Morocco weapons for use in the Sahara and Mauritania will be overshadowed by resentment, should Algeria’s support for Palestinian and other guerrilla groups expose the Boumediene Government to the economic sanctions of recent or anticipated American legislation on international terrorism. This is a very real possibility given Algeria’s relations with such organizations and strong Congressional support for legislation which would penalize governments associated with terrorist groups. Earlier this year [Page 61]the State Department suspended action for two months on Export-Import Bank operations regarding Algeria while examining Algeria’s links to guerrilla groups within the context of current legislation on Exim and terrorism.
Algeria maintains extensive contacts with a number of leftist dissident groups and with Palestinians of all persuasion, including Palestinian terrorist groups. Algiers provides some direct support—regular and diplomatic passports, monetary aid, and reportedly some military training—to Spanish and Canary Islands dissidents, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and members of Fatah as well as the Polisario. Some known international terrorists, including Carlos, have used Algeria as a transit or stopover point; Carlos is reported to use Algerian passports in some of his travels. Although Algeria has in the past granted airline hijackers safehaven and transit out of the country, it announced earlier this year that it would no longer accept a hijacked airliner unless Algerians were involved or unless asked to do so by a recognized international authority.
Finally, U.S. indefinite postponement for administrative reasons of the state visit that Boumediene had been invited to make in mid-1978 can be expected to irritate him.
Mauritania: Caught in the Middle
U.S. interests are fundamentally humanitarian, and are distinctly secondary to those in Algeria and Morocco. As the weakest link, Mauritania is bearing the brunt of the war and is dependent on conservative Arab money, Moroccan troops, and French aircraft for its survival. The Mauritanians would like to find a negotiated way out of the conflict that preserves their territory and political integrity, but are too reliant on Morocco to pursue an independent peace settlement policy.
U.S. Interests in the Maghreb
Security and Strategic
American regional security interests include maintenance of sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean, support for the Sixth Fleet, protection of NATO’s southern flank, and denial to the Soviets of bases and naval repair facilities in an area where they are now logistically disadvantaged.
Morocco’s control of the southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar and its Atlantic Ocean littoral therefore have important strategic significance for the U.S., especially as Morocco has a long history of cooperation with the U.S. in military matters. There were SAC airfields in the country’s early years, and more recently naval communications installations which just now are being phased out at U.S. initiative. The Moroccans continue to welcome U.S. naval visits, including those [Page 62]by nuclear powered warships, and have agreed to permit the Navy to continue to use Moroccan registered radio frequencies very important for Sixth Fleet operations. The King has agreed in principle to construction of a deep space optical tracking facility to be operated by the U.S. Air Force which will permit observations of Soviet satellites orbiting beyond the range of present U.S. sensors. He is interested in expanding his military relationship with the U.S.; and at a time of less troubled relations he would be sympathetic to U.S. requests for additional basing privileges should the U.S. decide these were desirable.
The Moroccans demonstrated in Shaba their willingness to react militarily to threats against moderate regimes in Africa. Less successful was a Moroccan effort to overthrow the avowedly Marxist-Leninist regime in Benin. The Moroccans currently are providing covert military assistance to the guerrillas contesting the Marxist MPLA’s control of Angola. Were they not preoccupied by the Sahara struggle, the Moroccans might be aiding the embattled Chadian Government defend itself against Libyan-backed insurgents.
Economic
There is a curious dichotomy in our national interests along the southern Mediterranean littoral. Not surprisingly, our political interests are high in moderate Morocco. But we have greater economic interests in “socialist” Algeria. U.S. petroleum imports from Algeria comprise 8 percent of our total imports of crude oil, and Algeria is becoming America’s principal source of LNG, which is an important energy source in some U.S. regional markets. American firms have won contracts valued at $6 billion, chiefly for construction of oil and LNG facilities. They hope to be awarded many more contracts as Algeria spends an additional estimated $17.4 billion developing its hydrocarbon sector through 1985. Outstanding loans to Algeria from Exim and private U.S. institutions approach $2 billion. U.S. exports to Algeria in 1977 amounted to $525 million.
The Moroccan economy is just beginning to become really accessible to American firms. U.S. exports were only $200 million in 1977. However, Westinghouse recently won a $215 million contract and is a strong contender for leadership in development plans both for Morocco’s promising uranium resources and for nuclear power. With as much as 60 percent of the world’s phosphate reserves, Morocco will have an important role in pricing this commodity, which is important for agricultural production. Extensive shale oil deposits will be exploited if economically viable technology can be developed.
Political
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U.S. political interests of both regional and global dimensions generally have been furthered by Morocco’s pro-Western orientation. [Page 63]Though careful to protect its Third World and Arab credentials, Morocco usually has promoted cooperative relations between the Third World and the Western democracies. Morocco has been very supportive of U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East. Hassan was one of the first and the most vocal supporter of Sadat’s peace initiative and has tried to extend the influence of the moderates within the Palestinian camp. Morocco’s activities in Africa have been beneficial to American and Western interests. Near Tangier, the Rabat Government permits the U.S. to operate an important VOA station broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
Despite Algiers’ initiatives to improve relations with Washington, the Boumediene Government’s positions on most regional and global issues are in sharp conflict with those of the U.S. Algeria had been helpful to earlier U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East by protecting Syria’s flank against more radical Arabs. But Boumediene’s outspoken opposition to Sadat’s peace initiative is a reminder of the strength of Algeria’s commitment to the Palestinians. An additional factor is the Algerian support to certain Palestinians and others engaging in international terrorism.
Soviet Interests in the Maghreb
Security and Strategic
With only limited use of major port facilities, and lagging in the development of a full range of mobile support capabilities, the Soviets have been seeking port and repair facilities throughout the western Mediterranean. Their objectives have been to ease the overcrowded Soviet Northern Fleet bases and to allow their diesel submarines to linger longer in the Mediterranean. They also have sought permission to base military aircraft in western Algeria, presumably to improve their surveillance of NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic.
Both Algeria and Morocco allow the Soviets to make port calls. These are frequent in Algeria and occasional in Morocco. Vessels of the USSR’s Mediterranean Squadron undertake routine repair and maintenance in and off the Algerian port of Annaba, and Algerian permission was recently requested for similar privileges elsewhere in Algeria. To date, the Soviets have been unsuccessful in their efforts to persuade the Algerians to grant them base rights in western Algeria.
Approximately 1,000 Soviet military advisors and technicians are stationed in Algeria, which has signed agreements for the purchase of a wide variety of sophisticated Soviet weaponry worth $1.3 billion. Although the Soviets do not provide direct military support to the Polisario guerrillas, they have not tried to block Algerian deliveries of Soviet arms to the Polisario.
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To preclude an exclusive Moroccan arms relationship with the West, the USSR maintains modest military sales and training programs in Morocco.
Economic
Soviet arms sales to Algeria are understood to be paid for in hard currency, which makes them a significant entry in each country’s commercial accounts. The Soviet Union also exports civilian goods to Algeria and provides economic assistance. However, a recently concluded $2 billion, 20-year agreement, which provides Soviet technical assistance, financing, and chemicals in return for deliveries of Moroccan phosphates, and an even more recent fishing agreement, probably will make Morocco the USSR’s largest trading partner in Africa.
Political
Within the Maghreb, Moscow places priority on its relations with “progressive” Algeria but clearly does not want to push the Moroccans closer to the West and therefore tries to maintain normal relations with King Hassan. The Soviets have avoided publicly choosing sides on the Sahara conflict. Like ourselves, the Soviets are believed to see little advantage in a war between Algeria and Morocco, although the persistence of tension facilitates Soviet arms sales and creates a degree of Algerian dependency they hope eventually will be of strategic benefit.
U.S. and Soviet Larger Interests in Africa and the Middle East
Soviet relations with the Maghreb are more clearly divided when the issues are regional or global. Although the stridently Third World Algerians sometimes criticize Soviet policies, Algiers and Moscow frequently share views. The Algerians assisted the Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola by permitting Soviet transport aircraft to refuel and overfly their territory. They have tended to side with the elements backed by the Soviets in the Ogaden and southern Africa. (At the same time, Algeria has apparently strongly cautioned Cuba against becoming involved militarily in Eritrea against Muslim Eritrean liberation elements which have in the past been supported by Algeria, Iraq and Cuba itself. To at least some extent these representations, and those by Iraq, appear to have played a role in inducing the present Cuban restraint.) The Moroccans consistently decry Soviet intervention on the African continent.
Again, there is less ambiguity when Soviet relations with the Maghreb are set within the context of Soviet interests in the Arab world. Algeria’s pro-Palestinian militancy and participation in the “steadfastness front” against Sadat coincide with Soviet objectives, while Morocco’s advocacy of a peaceful settlement is frequently at odds with Soviet tactics.
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American behavior in the dispute between Morocco and Algeria will influence attitudes toward the U.S. of other friendly Middle Eastern, European, and African nations. U.S. policies will have a negative impact on many of these countries to the extent they are perceived as part of a U.S. “failure” to oppose effectively the growth of Soviet/Cuban military influence in Africa. Morocco has close ties with France and with the other moderate regimes in these regions, e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Zaire. All of these countries share Hassan’s alarm about Soviet intrusions in Africa and favor a negotiated settlement to the Arab/Israeli dispute. Some of Algeria’s close associates in Africa and the Middle East, e.g., Libya, Iraq, PDRY, Angola, Benin, Madagascar, advocate Middle East policies generally supported by the Soviets; and the Africans among them have welcomed Soviet military intervention on their continent.
Moroccan Objectives in the Western Sahara Dispute
The Moroccan claims to the Sahara, supported by the large majority of Morocco’s population, have a deep historical and religious basis. The annexation of the territory in February 1976 was the expression of a powerful current of irredentism. In geopolitical terms, the Moroccan leadership viewed the annexation as a means of preventing the creation of a radical Algerian puppet state which would isolate Morocco from the rest of Africa; and the Sahara’s phosphate reserves were seen as important to the country’s economic future.
Hassan’s dominant personal interests are his continued reign and the perpetuation of the 300-year old Alaouite dynasty. His “recovery” of the Sahara has unified the nation behind him, and he could not surrender the territory without grave risk of a military coup or popular uprising. For the moment the military situation in the Sahara and Mauritania is manageable. But he would be sorely tempted to strike more aggressively at Polisario sanctuaries in Algeria, if the tide of battle turned against his forces. On the other hand, he realizes the danger to his position of a full-scale conflict with the much better armed Algerians, and he is painfully conscious of the growing financial burden of the ongoing guerrilla war. He is ready for a negotiated settlement, but only if it does not call into question the annexation of that portion of the Sahara he now controls.
Over the longer term Hassan will continue to regard the Soviets as sponsors of an ideology obviously alien to his regime and rule. This recognition will not preclude economic cooperation, but in the political sphere his preference will be the West, as long as he believes the West can resist Soviet ambitions. Should he become persuaded the West was going to abandon Africa to these ambitions, he probably would seek a temporizing accommodation with Moscow, hoping the West would rally before he was overthrown.
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Algerian Objectives
Much more than in the neighboring Kingdom, Algeria’s Sahara policy reflects the personal views of the leader, for Algerians generally do not actively support their Government’s stance. Because the motivation is to this extent personal, it is less clearly defined. Elements are believed to include Boumediene’s desire for Algerian geopolitical pre-eminence in northwest Africa as well as his pique at Hassan’s attempt to confront him with a fait accompli. There also is anger with Ould Daddah for his betrayal of their earlier partnership. Boumediene regards the Moroccan monarchy as an offensive anachronism and would be pleased to precipitate the King’s overthrow. Although he denies any Algerian territorial ambition, establishment of a client state would facilitate the export via the Atlantic of southwest Algeria’s mineral resources when and if commercial exploitation proves viable. There is also, however, some truth to Boumediene’s professions of concern for Saharan self-determination which probably evokes a sympathetic response from the more ideological elements of the ruling elite—as opposed to more pragmatic figures including Foreign Minister Bouteflika.
Although the Algerians have supported OAU consideration of the Sahara dispute, in contrast with the Moroccans, who have quietly sabotaged successive attempts to have it examined under OAU aegis, this presumably was for tactical advantage. Most potential intermediaries who visited both Rabat and Algiers reported the Algerians equally opposed to negotiations. As the costs of the conflict increase, and French support makes a Moroccan/Mauritanian defeat unlikely, the Algerians are perhaps becoming more willing to seek a negotiated settlement.
Over the longer term, the Algerians will remain highly nationalistic and reluctant to compromise their non-aligned status by giving the Soviets base rights. But they will cooperate with the Soviets in support of “progressive” Arab and African elements and might eventually grant some additional port privileges if their dependency on Soviet arms increases. The elaboration of their economic ties with the U.S. could modify their propensity to such behavior over the long run.
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Issabrahimi
j'ai lu le texte que tu as posté attentivement. voici le passage qui nous intéresse:
Les navires de l'escadre méditerranéenne de l'URSS effectuent des réparations et des entretiens de routine dans et au large du port algérien d'Annaba,
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